

meaningful to the American Jew. In the first place, it is a Jewish program of action, a release from eternally painful debate, an end of the Hamlet posture in Jewish life of "to be or not to be." What is more, it is a positive program, a creative program, radically different in moral tone from philanthropy and the negativism of self-defense. As such, it is for the sick Jewish soul a kind of occupational therapy. The James-Lange theory tells us that emotions are often the result of activity, that a sense of human significance is instilled not so much by argument as by living significantly. In so far as Palestine, then, offers a program of Jewish action that is more than merely negative and self-defensive, it has had the effect of inspiring Jews with a sense of inner worth. Furthermore, the range of Jewish achievement in Palestine has been large, physically, culturally and in the realm of concretizing social ideals. Through participation in that work and through self-identification with its success, Zionism has provided another instrument for restoration of inner dignity among Jews. But most of all, Palestine tends to be a prophylactic against self-contempt because of its contribution to Jewish cultural life. If any inference can be drawn from the Jewish past it is this. A living Jewish spiritual existence is the best guarantee against Jewish anti-Semitism. Any activity which enriches the content of Jewish life tends to preserve the integrity of the Jewish soul. And among these activities Palestine looms large.

There is one last significance of Palestine which is important to me, though it may not be important to any one else. I have been personally much concerned with certain ideological failures in contemporary Jewish living. And especially

with the theory that we are Jews purely as a matter of theology, that we are simply a religious communion. That theory of a Jewish identity seems to me to be most unfortunate. It is, in the first place, completely out of harmony with the facts of Jewish living. It has, in the second place, had an unhappy influence on wide areas of Jewish group expression. For obviously if it is only our creed which makes us Jews, then there is no room in Jewish life for the secular use of the Hebrew tongue, for Jewish literature, for art and music. Even our communal structure has been adversely affected by this mistaken definition. There can logically be no unified planned Jewish community which includes both the religious and non-religious Jew, if the Jewish identity be defined purely in religious terms. I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am no secularist and I am not arguing against the meaning and the validity of Jewish religious and moral attitudes. I am, as it happens, earnestly a religionist, who believes both in the validity of the Jewish religion and in its essential place in any scheme of Jewish living. But I do object to a truncated Judaism from which, through the surgery of a misguided logic, everything has been excised except creed and morality. Such a Judaism seems to me too tenuous and too pallid to be a source of spiritual stimulation, of cultural enrichment, or a preservative of Jewish self-respect. And here in a subtle and devious fashion, Palestine has made a distinct contribution to Jewish life in America. It becomes, as time goes, on less and less possible to hold a minimum philosophy of Judaism, to a definition purely in terms of creed, when one faces the real existence of a Jewish settlement in Palestine. Inevitably, that phenomenon leads one to talk in terms of the larger

and more fruitful concepts of Jewish culture and Jewish civilization.

I have attempted to be balanced and circumspect all through this discussion. I have denied explicitly that Zionism involves either any division of political loyalty or withdrawal from American cultural life, or yet indifference to the economic and political problems of the American society in which we participate. I have admitted frankly that Zionism of and by itself cannot dispose of the entire social problem of east European Jewry and that it cannot of and by itself resolve the cultural and psychic difficulties facing American Jews. But if I have been explicit in my reservations, I wish to be equally explicit in my assertions. Palestine is nonetheless the most hopeful haven of refuge for tens of thousands of east European Jews. It is nonetheless the most promising instrument for the revitalization of Jewish cultural life. It plays nonetheless a central role in the re-

storation of Jewish self-respect. That is not everything. Zionism is no panacea. But it is a great deal—enough to enlist the support and devotion of American Jews.

For any Jew who is concerned with assistance to his fellow-Jews abroad, for any Jew who wants himself and his children to live as Jews and to enjoy the experience, Palestine is simultaneously a cause, an adventure, a necessity and a hope.

But for those Jews who wish to play their Jewishness down or who desire not to live as Jews at all, who would like to lose their own identities through assimilation, and who would desire that the Jewish group disappear and with it the unique religious culture which it carries, for these Jews Zionism is a misfortune, something to be resisted to the last ounce of energy,—which, from my point of view, is the most elaborate tribute and compliment which can be paid to the place of Palestine in contemporary Jewish life.

JEWISH MORALE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION

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JANUARY 30, 1933 is a significant date in the history of the Jews, because the events of the day crystallized a wide-spread attack upon the civil and economic status of the Jews throughout the world. The date was significant also because of the enormous internal consequences that it has had on the thinking of Jews, on the philosophy of Jewish life and on the whole complex of moods and emotions of Jews, as individuals and as a group.

On that day, Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany. For the first time in modern history, a zealot came into

power in an advanced country of the western world, with a philosophy stemming directly back to the darkest days of the Middle Ages; with a point of view that apotheosized racial fanaticism, super-nationalism and anti-Semitism.

What followed both in Germany and without is generally known. It will be unnecessary to enumerate at any length the long and painful sequence of human rights violated, of useful and distinguished lives blasted, of careers ruthlessly destroyed and of the devastating repudiation of the law and order of modern civilization. It will be equally unnecessary

to detail the effects of this new tidal wave of passion and fanaticism in other parts of the world: the intensification of anti-Semitism in Poland and Roumania; the embitterment of the lot of the Jews in other parts of eastern Europe; the infiltration of anti-Semitism in the democratic countries of the west, and the increasingly prevailing sense of insecurity, doubt and foreboding among Jews everywhere.

Much has happened throughout the world since that unhappy day, but nothing possibly has had a greater and more vital effect upon the Jews themselves than the agony of renewed fundamental questioning. The "who's", the "why's", the "whither's", which, until that time, had concerned a comparatively small number of Jews in their capacity as historians and philosophers, are now being asked by the vast multitude in terms of direct relationship to their own lives and futures.

As was to be expected, German Jews themselves have manifested the deepest concern in a re-appraisal of life's values. German-Jewish literature today has revealed in its books, magazines and brochures, that German Jewry is weighted with the profoundest and most soul-searching revaluations. The crisis in Germany has given rise to, among other things, a movement for a return to religious fundamentals; a nascent and ambitious nationalism; misgiving as to the reality of emancipation and a challenging of its values—in short, a plethora of views and policies for the solution of which answers are essential to questions of the meaning of the Jew and his relation to society.

One of the first of the accepted verities of modern Jewish life to be faced with a grave challenge was that of emancipation. By emancipation we mean that historical process whereby the Jews, who

theretofore had, as a group, a peculiar and segregated status in the communities in which they lived, were given the opportunity to break out of that restricted status and enter the open arena of social, political and economic integration with the populations in whose midst they lived.

Faith in that philosophy, which has animated Jews in the countries where they had an opportunity legally to enjoy equal economic, political and cultural rights, was the first to crack under the strain of new and incredible disasters. The reasoning was something like the following: For a century the Jews in Germany attempted to integrate themselves in the life of their fatherland. Save in the religious element, they were Germans, molded and influenced by the German environment; speakers of the German language; writers of German literature—reflecting in their individual and group life the influences that pressed upon the consciousness of all German people. They regarded themselves as being, in all essential aspects, flesh of the flesh and bone of the bone of the German nation.

Yet, the reasoning continues, they were rejected. The events from January, 1933, have shown the German people resisting these overtures for integration, creating a barrier which, true enough, has no truly scientific character, but which for all practical purposes served to set the Jews in Germany apart from all others. The *quod erat demonstrandum* was that emancipation was a failure; that this striving of the Jews for integration in the life of the people was doomed to collapse since it lacked basis in reality.

In consequence, the morale of Jews has suffered a severe shock. Because it must be evident that, abstractly, whether Jews approved of the theories of emancipation or not, in actual practice they

were swung along in its stream. Some Jews in occidental countries might resist it from the public forum or in published manuscript, but few even among them were actually unaffected by its progressive and vitalizing influences. By and large, Jews were gratefully taking advantage of the opportunities of emancipation, although here and there one might find an expression of philosophic doubt or sentimental nostalgia.

Since this has become the fundamental rock upon which the waves of Jewish thought have beaten and broken, let us examine it in further detail, particularly in relation to the experience in Germany.

The catastrophe in Germany, if it is to be taken at all as an index and a guide to what the future holds for the Jews, cannot be too carefully examined. In much that has been written about the Jews in Germany, pertinent material has been overlooked; much has been made to appear simple that is in reality complex; and numerous inferences and conclusions have been drawn, frequently on the basis of inadequate or garbled information and under the sway of emotions rather than reason. Indeed, since Hitlerism came into power in Germany, we have had more than our share of prophets of doom and disaster who revel in predictions of similar catastrophes in other parts of the world and even in our own country.

A widely prevalent error is the assumption that Hitlerism in Germany meant largely anti-Semitism. Those who make that error, which in turn becomes the basis of other misjudgments, overlook several significant factors. They overlook the fact that Hitlerism was primarily a vengeful, nationalistic political creed that had vast elements of appeal to a country severely crippled by the industrial crisis; that had been defeated in

war time; burdened and humiliated by an ignominious peace treaty; shackled by debt and torn by the extremes of partisanship as no other country in the world.

Parenthetically, those who are given to glib "told you so's" about the German Jews should be reminded that in Germany Jews were organized for self-defense as in no other community in the world, and that if they failed, not only they—a handful—failed, but that many more millions of Germans—socialists, Catholics, communists, liberals, democrats—with infinitely more resources and power, were unable to stem the wave that finally engulfed them all.

It would be stupid not to draw a lesson from the events in Germany, but it would be even a graver and more tragic stupidity to draw wrong inferences.

For, in addition to the immediate factors in German contemporary life that gravitated naturally toward a conquest of power by the fanatical extremists, consideration must be given to the intangible and yet important aspects of German history and German tradition. National-Socialism is a product of modern Germany, but anti-Semitism in Germany is as old as the baronial castles that dot the Rhine. Indeed, the very emancipation that is now being battered and bruised was a legal act in Germany for less than a hundred years, and a complete reality only since 1919.

The events in Germany and their repercussions elsewhere have been variously interpreted. They have led, in some cases, to a continuance of indifference, based on a belief that everything is traceable to the world's economic ills, that a recovery of world prosperity will relegate anti-Semitism to the background, or drive it underground, or perhaps even destroy it. This reaction, however, has been

shown by comparatively few. Among the majority of Jews, the events in Germany have created dangerous emotional conflicts: helplessness and arrogance; despair and chauvinism; defeatism and megalomania. These paradoxical moods have agitated the Jewish public mind throughout the past four years to the subordination of rational processes. Nazi chauvinism has not been without its counterpart among some of our extremists who in their way overstress Jewish nationalism. On the other hand, the sense of inferiority of the German people, to which National-Socialism is a natural reaction, has also had its counterpart among some Jews. Both of these moods are pernicious; they reflect a capitulation to medievalism which can only serve to weaken the forces of progress and enlightenment.

No one can adequately answer the current questions relating to practical Jewish action unless he has formulated a clear conception of what are or should be the ideals of the Jews and the direction that Jews must chart for themselves.

The first need is to set our own minds in order. We should, first, determine whether we are to be dragooned by the mad attack of savagery, newly come to life, into a corresponding defection from our own ethical standards; or whether we are to keep our eyes fixed on high and preserve the sanctions of civilized behavior.

Our second need is to evolve a practical program that will enable us to withstand the assaults upon our lives and honor. It is, of course, essential that our weapons of defense at no time lose contact with the realities of life. We must be careful not to accept the conditions pressed upon by us by the anti-Semites, and fight with their weapons and shout their battle-cry. Their clamor that the

Jews are an inferior race is not silenced by the contrary claim of racial superiority, or even by the denial of racial inferiority when the truth reveals that, from the viewpoint of biological anthropology, the Jews are not a race at all. Inflated nationalism on the one side will not in the long run be adequately met by an artificial, spurious nationalism on the other side. In short, the answer to cruel and oppressive myths lies not in the creation by Jews of pleasantly self-indulgent myths, but in a loyal adherence to the truth.

Our chief reliance, we all agree, is on public opinion. But how can we win that public opinion? The issue should not be confused, for one thing, by a raucous shouting of slogans and a contemptuous disregard of "*ma-yomru-hagoyim*." "What do the Gentiles say," is in essence the definition of world public opinion, that coy and elusive ally whom we all seek so ardently to woo.

Can we win this public opinion by an appeal merely to sympathy on the grounds of injustices perpetrated on a religious group against whom there is a widespread aversion built up over centuries of prejudice? Can we appeal merely to the sentiment of a world in the belief that ideals of justice and brotherly love are determining factors that govern masses of humanity in their human relations? If the special appeal to the sympathy of the world for the Jews cannot overcome the prejudices of the ages, will an appeal to the broader conception of human rights in general be more availing? And, if so, will they come about if we ourselves submit to primitive emotions of "fighting fire with fire," violence with violence, and frenzied agitation by corresponding agitation?

And to probe still more deeply, we must

ask ourselves whether we can survive against Nazism at the same time that we consciously or unconsciously capitulate to its theories that the Jews are a distinct race, alien, unadaptable in the western world, and an indissoluble ingredient in the chemistry of the human race.

These are the questions that we must soberly ask and answer before we can intelligently chart the course that must be followed. A comparatively new philosophy of Jewish life threatens to overwhelm the theory that the destiny of most Jews is to live in the world at large as members of the nations of which they are a part. It insists instead, that the Jews are essentially different from their neighbors. An outstanding Jewish leader has described our difference as "ethnical, eternal and inevitable." Proponents of that view seek a solution of the problem in far-reaching nationalism. They regard Palestine as the paramount objective of Jewish life. They hold life outside of Palestine to be *Galuth* (exile), Palestine as the only solution and the Jews of the Diaspora as essentially building material for Palestine. They call for the organization of an all-embracing Diaspora national life; which means a voluntary ghettoization regardless of the consequences.

Against this point of view there is the older concept which, while allowing for support of the development of a Jewish home in Palestine (not excluding the establishment of a Jewish state), maintains that the vast majority of Jews will have to, and should, continue to live in the world at large and that they should, insofar as possible, without compromising their religion and surrendering their traditions, be in complete harmony with the majority population of the countries in which they live. They hold with Rabbi

A. A. Neuman that "Jewish culture has always operated in a field of diverse cultures—it has never lived in a spiritual or geographical isolation." Can the emphasis upon the self-segregation of Jews win the confidence of our neighbors whose psychological conditioning has prejudiced them into a state of unreasoning suspicion and fear of the alien?

In the slow and difficult task of winning public opinion, we must be willing to sacrifice the lesser for the greater good, and the immediate and transient effects for the more lasting advantages. We must avoid braggadocio and eschew retaliation. We must apply the test of intelligence and wisdom rather than that of group pride and sentimental group exaltation.

Our vantage-point must necessarily be one that views Nazism as a much bigger and more tragic thing than merely an attack upon the Jews. All our efforts must converge in the realization that the situation signifies more than merely an attack upon the Jews, but that it is, in fact, an assault on modern civilization and on the ideals held precious by free men everywhere.

Excessive emphasis on the Jewish aspects in the Hitler situation has unfortunately only served to blind public opinion to the more broadly serious implications. Such identification of Nazism with anti-Semitism has handicapped efforts to arouse Christendom at large and especially to stir the American people to the danger to America of anti-Semitic agitation.

Although it is necessarily part of our task to be vigilant toward all the manifestations of anti-Semitism, we must not lose our perspective to the degree of failing to view them as symptoms of a worldwide psychosis whose cure cannot be ef-

fectured by a superficial treatment. The Pelleys, Edmondsons, the Trues and Fritz Kuhns are noisome symptoms. They need concern us less than the larger task of immunizing the public mind and building up a resistance to the virus of group hatred.

We have every right to utilize the whole technique of modern education, and all its media—the platform and the pulpit, the press, the radio, the films, the schools, the churches, the clubs. How they shall be utilized is of great importance since an inexpert use of these avenues of public opinion may do more harm than good. Once it was said, "You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." But how can we bring the truth about the Jew to the millions who are misinformed or ignorant? How can we answer the slanders, accusations and lies so skillfully propagated by our antagonists? We are all agreed that much can be done by refuting falsehoods with facts, but how are these facts to be presented? Shall they come in the form of hysterical denials, or in the form of scientifically proven conclusions? Shall they come to mass meetings, or rather by way of authoritative and widespread pronouncement by men of competence and special knowledge? Shall they come from individuals and organizations open to the suspicion of bias, or shall they come from scientific congresses (on questions of race); unquestioned legal and juridical experts (on charges of world dominance)? In

the answer to these questions lie, in a large measure, the differences in the practical strategy of the various organizations dedicated to the defense of the rights and good name of the Jews.

These times are, if anything, a challenge to the Jews to maintain clarity of vision, to resist efforts from without and within to blind us with emotions and to confuse us with demagogic slogans. Our point of view has long been that of a civilized community with faith in the spiritual values of mankind and with an incessant striving for the attainment of the ideals of the brotherhood of man. Our enemies have surrendered these ideals for the law of the jungle.

Would it not be a betrayal of our traditions if we sought survival at the price of capitulation to their false ideologies? Has it not become imperative, indeed vital, to resist the absorption of the pernicious doctrine of Nazism into the common language and thinking of those whose ancestors were counted among the prophets? Despite intolerable provocation, despite every natural temptation to employ the savage sanctions of our antagonists, we must place our faith in the substantial values of civilization and submit to the restraints of civilized people.

No one can foretell what the future may hold for us, but it is safe to predict that the Jews will lose most, if, in the creation of false defenses, they yield the inner stronghold of the free, rational and courageous spirit.

Group and Case Work Relationships

AN EXPERIMENT IN THE UTILIZATION OF GROUP WORK AND CASE WORK TECHNIQUE IN A GROUP

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THE questions, what is the relation of case work to group work; are they different expressions of the same thing?; what is the function of case work, and what is the function of group work, have been raised time and again during the past few years. These questions have more than a theoretical foundation, they are born of an increased study of the group work process and the focusing of attention by both case work and group work on service to the individual. The concept of generic social work, of service to the entire individual, must have also brought the attention of these fields to each other.

Cleveland has been involved in this discussion because of the presence of Western Reserve University with its School of Applied Social Sciences and the organization of the Cleveland Welfare Federation which provides for both a Case work and a Group work Council.

Thinking on the relationship of these two fields of social work affected the agencies in Cleveland when the Joint Committee of the Case and Group Work Councils was organized in the spring of 1934. One of the early concerns of the committee was in the realm of referrals between case work and group work agencies. Experiments in referrals were organized and involved a number of the agencies. The paper presented by Mr. Erlen tells of the experiences and implications of the referral study which involved the Council Educational Alliance and the Jewish So-

cial Service Bureau.

The interest in the experiment about to be described developed during the activity season of 1935-36 as a result of the analysis of group records by the Joint Committee and the Trends Committee of the Cleveland Chapter of the American Association of Social Workers. These committees meeting separately were examining records to determine the relationship between case work and group work. In the spring of 1936 the Joint Committee accepted the proposal to experiment with four groups in varied agencies under the guidance of the Joint Committee, the Trends Committee of the American Association of Social Workers and the research unit of the School of Applied Social Sciences of Western Reserve University. In each of these experimental groups there was to be a trained group worker as the leader and a case worker who would observe the group. One of these experimental clubs was located at the Council Educational Alliance. The cooperating case work agency was the Jewish Social Service Bureau. A consulting committee which included a member of the executive staff of the group work agency, a member of the executive staff of the case work agency, the leader of the group chosen, the case worker appointed to observe the group, a chairman who was a member of the case work staff of the School of Applied Social Sciences, and a secretary who is a student in the case work department of the School. Sim-