



**The Palestinian
Autonomy Agreement
and Israel-PLO
Recognition**

A Survey of
American Jewish Opinion

Renaë Cohen

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The Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations, an arm of the American Jewish Committee, undertakes programs and activities in the United States and Israel designed to enhance the collaboration between the two largest and most important Jewish communities in the world.

The Institute was grounded on these premises:

1. The American Jewish community is a creative and viable community with a positive future in the United States.

2. American Jewry's commitment to Israel's security and survival is strong and irrevocable; for many, Israel is a major ingredient of their Jewish identity.

3. Israelis realize the importance of the existence of strong and viable Jewish communities in the Diaspora and, in particular, of the American Jewish community, for the future of the Jewish people.

4. Events that affect either community are likely to affect other Jewish communities.

Robert S. Rifkind
Chairman

Steven Bayme
Director

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Renaë Cohen

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FOREWORD

How do American Jews view the Israel-PLO accord? How attached to Israel are American Jews at this time? Both of these vital matters are taken up in detail in an American Jewish Committee-sponsored survey conducted the week after Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and PLO leader Yasir Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn. Renae Cohen, in reporting the results of the survey, paints a portrait in numbers that helps clarify American Jewish attitudes toward the peace process as well as the ties that bind American Jews to Israel.

David Singer, *Director*
Department of Research and Publications

INTRODUCTION

September 13, 1993, has become known as the "day of the handshake" between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and PLO leader Yasir Arafat. Whether this event irrevocably changes the course of Middle Eastern politics only time will tell. What is clear is the dramatic impact the accord signing has had upon American Jewish-Israeli relations. First, public-opinion support among American Jews for the accords runs extraordinarily high. Although a number of prominent rabbis and intellectuals have publicly opposed the Rabin initiative, the Israeli government's action enjoys a broad consensus of support within the American Jewish community. This support prevails across traditional divides between affiliated and unaffiliated and among religious movements. For example, almost three-quarters of Orthodox Jews support the government's action despite outspoken statements of opposition by a number of prominent Orthodox rabbis. Similarly, a clear majority of American Jews now accept the idea of a Palestinian state. As recently as a few months ago, such survey responses would have been unthinkable. Rather these public-opinion soundings suggest that most American Jews follow Israel's lead on questions affecting Israeli security and Middle East peace.

The second transformation resulting from the "handshake" concerns the reconfiguration of Israel-Diaspora relations. At the Council of Jewish Federations General Assembly in Montreal in November 1993, Prime Minister Rabin anticipated a new era in Israel-Diaspora relations in which political support and fund-raising for Israel would become secondary to questions of enhancing Jewish continuity and strengthening Diaspora economic investments within Israel. To be sure, discussion of this new agenda preceded the handshake. Jewish continuity has been the byword in Jewish communal life since the release of the National Jewish Population Survey in 1991. Similarly, upon becoming prime minister, Rabin quickly sug-

gested that the political role of American Jewish organizations ought be reduced in favor of state-to-state diplomacy. However, September 13 clearly signaled that we may be entering a new phase of Israel-Diaspora relations in which Jewish organizations need to reconsider their programming as it relates to Israel and to current needs of world Jewry.

The following survey of American Jewish opinion, the eighth in a series of biannual surveys conducted by the American Jewish Committee under the auspices of its Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations, provides a research base for reconsideration of the Israel-Diaspora agenda. It suggests that Israel and the Israeli government enjoy great capital and credibility among American Jews. The legacy of the Gulf War and the symbolism of the "handshake" suggest that whatever distance and alienation from Israel was expressed at the height of the *intifada* has lessened considerably, while the percentages of American Jews reporting close feelings and ties to Israel are at a high point.

To be sure, the support expressed for the peace process should not be misconstrued as American Jews harboring illusions concerning the PLO and the Arab world. A plurality of American Jews does not trust the PLO to keep its word given Arafat's long record of broken promises. The Orthodox especially are most likely to believe that the PLO remains intent upon the destruction of Israel. Strong minorities within the Reform and Conservative movements echo this view.

Equally significant are the percentage gaps between Israelis who support the accord and American Jews—with less than two-thirds of Israelis in September 1993 endorsing the initiative in contrast to almost 90 percent of American Jews. This disparity must be understood within a context of overall broad support for the accords in Israel amid considerable domestic opposition and mistrust of PLO and Arab commitments to a meaningful peace. Whether American Jews will maintain current levels of support for the peace process can be measured only over the course of time. Equally questionable is whether American Jews can maintain similar levels of commitment and energies for an Israel at peace as it has historically for an Israel at war. That challenge may well be the best test of all of the Zionism and Jewish identity of today's American Jewry.*

Steven Bayme, *Director*
Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations

THE PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT AND ISRAEL-PLO RECOGNITION: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWISH OPINION

ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1993, leaders of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization met on the White House lawn in Washington, D.C., to sign a historic agreement establishing mutual Israel-PLO recognition and Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho. The signing ceremony, which was broadcast live around the world and included a handshake between Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO leader Yasir Arafat, marked a major turning point in Israel-Arab relations that would have been inconceivable only a few weeks earlier. To gauge the reaction of American Jews to this milestone event, the American Jewish Committee commissioned a special public-opinion survey. The poll, the eighth in a series of AJC-sponsored surveys of American Jews dating back to 1983, was conducted the week after the peace agreement was signed. In designing the questionnaire, use was made of many of the same items that had appeared in an AJC-sponsored survey of Israeli attitudes fielded on September 7-8, just prior to the signing ceremony.¹ Thus it is possible to compare directly American Jewish and Israeli opinion about the Israel-PLO accord. At the same time, other items in the American Jewish questionnaire were drawn from previous AJC-sponsored surveys of American Jews, making it possible to monitor trends over time. This applies to items dealing with the Arab-Israel conflict as well as with the attachment of American Jews to Israel.

¹ The survey was conducted for the American Jewish Committee by the Guttman Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem. The complete results are available in *The Palestinian Autonomy Agreement: A Survey of Israeli Public Opinion* (American Jewish Committee, 1993).

Methodology

Design

The telephone survey was conducted for the American Jewish Committee by Market Facts, Inc., a national survey-research company, during September 20-26, 1993. No interviewing occurred on Friday evening, September 24, or on Saturday, September 25, because of the Sabbath and the Yom Kippur holiday. The sample consisted of 1,009 self-identified Jewish respondents selected from the company's consumer mail panel and demographically representative of the U.S. adult Jewish population in terms of age, household income, gender, and geographic region. The margin of error is plus or minus three percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level.

Respondents

The respondents are fairly typical of contemporary American Jewry in a number of ways. Overall, and consistent with earlier Market Facts samples, they appear somewhat "more Jewish" on a variety of identification indicators than the 1990 NJPS Core Jewish population.²

Forty-nine percent of the respondents are men and 51 percent are women. Thirty-seven percent are under age 40, 31 percent 40-59, and 32 percent 60 and over. Seventy-five percent are married and 25 percent are unmarried. Twenty-two percent report their 1992 household incomes as under \$30,000, 30 percent as \$30-49,999, 24 percent as \$50-74,999, and 24 percent as \$75,000 and over. Seventeen percent have a high-school education or less, 24 percent have some college education, 24 percent are college graduates, and 29 percent have some postgraduate education.

Denominationally, 7 percent identify as Orthodox, 35 percent as Conservative, 33 percent as Reform, 1 percent as Reconstructionist, and 24 percent as "Just Jewish." Fifty-six percent belong to a synagogue or temple; 40 percent belong to a Jewish organization other than a synagogue or temple. In terms of synagogue attendance, 12 percent report attendance

² For specific comparisons, see Addendum (p. 45).

only on special occasions, 8 percent only on the High Holidays, 8 percent once or twice a year, 22 percent a few times a year, 14 percent about once a month, and 25 percent more frequently; 12 percent report no attendance at all. Of the married respondents, 79 percent report having Jewish spouses. A majority of respondents (68 percent) received some kind of formal part-time Jewish education, another 10 percent having had day-school or yeshiva education; 21 percent had no formal Jewish education.

The majority report that they always or usually light Hanukkah candles (82 percent) and attend a Passover seder (80 percent); 42 percent always or usually celebrate Purim; 14 percent always or usually have a Christmas tree. While a strong majority (67 percent) have never been to Israel, 33 percent have visited there at least once. Finally, 59 percent report that being Jewish is "very important" to them, with another 35 percent saying it is "fairly important"; only 6 percent say it is "not very important."

Key Findings

Among the key findings of the survey with regard to the Israel-PLO accord and surrounding issues are the following:

1. Ninety percent of American Jews view mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO as a "positive development from Israel's point of view." Only 7 percent of American Jews see mutual recognition as a "negative" development for Israel, while 3 percent are "not sure."

2. Asked in general terms whether they are for or against the plan for Palestinian autonomy that would begin in Gaza and Jericho and then extend to other areas in the West Bank, 75 percent of American Jews answer "for," 13 percent answer "against," and another 13 percent indicate "not sure." Sixty-nine percent of American Jews support the Palestinian autonomy plan as it applies to Gaza, 64 percent as it applies to Jericho, and 43 percent as it applies to other areas in the West Bank.

3. Seventy-three percent of American Jews believe that the plan for Palestinian autonomy "increases the chance for peace with the Arabs," while 17 percent maintain that the plan "increases the possibility of another war." Two percent of respondents take the view that the Palestinian autonomy plan "neither increases the possibility of war nor the chance for peace," while another 9 percent are "not sure."

4. Asked "Given the current situation, do you favor or oppose the es-

establishment of a Palestinian state?" 57 percent of American Jews "favor," 30 percent "oppose," and 13 percent are "not sure."

5. More negatively, only 34 percent of American Jews believe that the PLO can "be relied upon to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorist activity against Israel." Forty-two percent of American Jews see the PLO as unreliable in this regard, while 25 percent are "not sure."

6. With regard to the Golan Heights, when asked "What should Israel be willing to give up on the Golan Heights in order to reach a peace agreement with Syria?" a majority of American Jews answer "none of it" (27 percent) or "only a small part of it" (30 percent). In contrast, 29 percent of American Jews favor giving up "some of it," 5 percent "most of it," and 2 percent "all of it."

7. On the question of the status of Jerusalem, when asked "In the framework of a permanent peace with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction?" 62 percent of American Jews respond "no," 30 percent say "yes," and 8 percent are "not sure."

8. While support for the Israel-PLO accord is very widespread among American Jews, relatively less enthusiasm for the agreement is shown by various subgroups of respondents: the Orthodox, those with less education, those with lower incomes, those who have visited Israel, and those who feel "very close" to Israel. No strong and consistent differences show themselves for gender or age.

Other key findings of the survey relating to the attachment of American Jews to Israel are the following:

9. A substantial majority of American Jews express strong attachment to Israel. Thus 79 percent of American Jews agree that "Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew." In addition, 68 percent agree with the statement "If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life."

10. Various subgroups of American Jews show greater or lesser attachment to Israel. Overall, it is Orthodox (and sometimes Conservative) Jews, older Jews, inmarried Jews, Jews who belong to synagogues and Jewish organizations, and Jews who have visited Israel who feel closest to Israel.

11. While attachment to Israel is strong, only one-third of American Jews have ever been to Israel, 21 percent having visited once and another

12 percent more than once. In addition, only 29 percent of American Jews describe themselves as Zionists.

12. A large majority (75 percent) of American Jews feel confident that the United States will continue to support Israel. At the same time, a near majority (49 percent) of American Jews maintain "When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive."

The Israel-PLO Accord and the Peace Process

General Results

Support for the Israel-PLO agreement is widespread among American Jews. Thus 84 percent of respondents support "the Israeli government's current handling of the peace negotiations with the Arabs"; in contrast, only 9 percent oppose it, another 8 percent answering "not sure." A strong majority (87 percent) say that the Israeli government was right "in opening negotiations with the PLO in order to reach an agreement on Palestinian autonomy"; 8 percent say that the government was wrong, while 5 percent are not sure. Ninety percent feel that the official mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO is positive; only 7 percent consider it negative, while 3 percent are not sure. Finally, in general terms, 75 percent of respondents are "for" the Palestinian autonomy plan, 13 percent are against it, and 13 percent are not sure.

Sixty-eight percent of respondents disagree with the statement "Israel should reject the principle of 'trading land for peace,'" while 27 percent agree and another 5 percent are not sure. This represents a significant shift in attitude from 1991, when a plurality of American Jews (45 percent) agreed, while 27 percent disagreed and 28 percent were not sure. Correspondingly, about two-thirds support the autonomy plan as it applies to the Gaza Strip (for, 69 percent; against, 15 percent; not sure, 16 percent) and to Jericho (for, 64 percent; against, 17 percent; not sure, 20 percent). However, when asked about extending Palestinian autonomy to other areas in the West Bank at a later stage, a plurality rather than a majority voices support (for, 43 percent; against, 34 percent; not sure, 23 percent).

A majority of American Jews see Israel's overall situation as "very

good" (9 percent) or "good" (56 percent); only 7 percent see it as bad ("very bad," 1 percent; "bad," 6 percent); 26 percent see it as "neither good nor bad"; and another 2 percent are not sure. Indeed, 66 percent see Israel's situation as "better now" than it was a year ago; only 4 percent see it as "worse now"; 27 percent see it as "about the same"; 2 percent are "not sure."

American Jews are generally optimistic about the impact of the autonomy plan on the chances for peace, although they do see future violence in the area. Thus 73 percent think that the plan "increases the chance for peace with the Arabs," while 17 percent believe that it "increases the possibility of another war"; 2 percent say that it "neither increases the possibility of war nor the chance of peace," and another 9 percent are not sure. Two-thirds (66 percent) do not think that "there will be a war between Israel and the Arabs in the near future"; 20 percent predict there will be a war and 14 percent are not sure. (Of those who foresee a war, the majority think it will occur either "in another year or two" [40 percent] or "perhaps 3-5 years from now" [36 percent].)

While a plurality (49 percent) of American Jews believe that the autonomy plan will lead to a weakening of terrorist activity against Israel in the next year, 38 percent believe that such activity will strengthen; 13 percent are not sure. Moreover, a significant majority predict that in the wake of the agreement, there will be violence in the territories between Palestinians with differing political views (yes, 81 percent; no, 14 percent; not sure, 6 percent). In addition, a majority foresee violence in Israel between Jews with differing political views (yes, 55 percent; no, 39 percent; not sure, 6 percent).

A number of items probed attitudes toward possible Israeli policies. Views about Jewish settlements in Gaza and the West Bank are nearly evenly split. Thus 47 percent of respondents do not feel that Jewish settlements should continue to be established in the West Bank and Gaza at this time, while 43 percent support continued settlement; 11 percent are not sure.

A clear majority of American Jews think that the autonomy agreement is likely to lead to a Palestinian state (likely, 66 percent; not likely, 20 percent; not sure, 14 percent), and a majority favor the establishment of such a state (favor, 57 percent; oppose, 30 percent; not sure, 13 percent). This majority support is consistent with the attitudes measured in 1991,

just after the Gulf War, when a similar item was fielded. At that time, 51 percent agreed that "In the framework of a peace agreement, Israel should be willing to allow for the establishment of a Palestinian state with security arrangements acceptable to Israel." Twenty-one percent disagreed, and 28 percent were not sure.

Sixty-two percent of American Jews maintain that Israel should not compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction, while 30 percent favor a compromise, and 8 percent are not sure. (Despite the fact that a majority reject a compromise, this view has become less prevalent since 1991, when a comparably worded item was fielded. At that time, 80 percent of American Jews agreed with the statement "As part of any peace settlement with the Arabs, Israel must retain control of a united Jerusalem as its capital city"; 4 percent disagreed and 15 percent were not sure.)

When asked how much land Israel should give up on the West Bank in order to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians, a plurality of American Jews support giving up "some of it" (44 percent), while large numbers prefer giving up "none of it" (15 percent) or "only a small part of it" (23 percent). Fewer respondents favor giving up "all of it" (2 percent) or "most of it" (10 percent); 6 percent are "not sure."

When asked what Israel should be willing to give up on the Golan Heights in order to reach a peace agreement with Syria, a majority of American Jews support giving up "only a small part of it" (30 percent) or "none of it" (27 percent); 29 percent answer "some of it"; 5 percent say "most of it"; 2 percent say "all of it"; and 6 percent answer "not sure."

Despite the high level of support for the autonomy agreement, large pluralities or minorities of American Jews voice mistrust of Palestinians and Arabs. Thus a plurality (42 percent) believe that the PLO cannot "be relied upon to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorist activity against Israel"; 34 percent feel that the PLO can be relied upon; and another 25 percent are not sure. Or again, a third (34 percent) agree that "The PLO is determined to destroy Israel," although a majority (57 percent) disagree; 10 percent are not sure. It is important to note, however, that concern about the PLO has lessened significantly. Thus, when respondents were asked in 1991 and 1989 to agree or disagree with the statement "The PLO is determined to destroy Israel," large majorities agreed (1991, 83 percent; 1989, 62 percent), while only small minorities disagreed (1991, 4

percent; 1989, 8 percent). (Thirteen percent answered "not sure" in 1991, 31 percent in 1989.)

In addition to expressing some doubt about the PLO, 42 percent of American Jews believe that "The goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel," although 50 percent disagree; 9 percent are not sure. When a comparable item was fielded in 1991, 51 percent agreed that "You can never trust the Arabs to make a real peace with Israel." Twenty-three percent disagreed, and 26 percent were not sure. The corresponding figures from two earlier fieldings were as follows: 1989: agree, 49 percent; disagree, 20 percent; not sure, 31 percent; 1986: agree, 44 percent; disagree, 23 percent; not sure, 33 percent.

Subgroup Differences

Despite the overall high level of support among American Jews for the Israel-PLO accord, various subgroups exhibit greater or lesser enthusiasm. In this regard, Conservative, Reform, and "Just Jewish" Jews are more likely than the Orthodox to indicate support; respondents with higher household incomes are more likely to favor the plan than those with lower incomes; respondents who received the most education are more likely to support the plan than those who received the least. Interestingly, respondents who have been to Israel are somewhat less likely to express support than those who have not been to Israel, and those who report that they feel "very close" to Israel are less likely to express support than those who feel "fairly close" or "very/fairly distant" to Israel. No strong and consistent differences by gender and age show themselves.

Thus large majorities of Conservative (84 percent), Reform (90 percent), and "Just Jewish" (83 percent) respondents as against 52 percent of Orthodox respondents support the Israeli government's handling of the peace negotiations with the Arabs. Similarly, 88 percent of Conservative Jews, 91 percent of Reform Jews, and 86 percent of the "Just Jewish" as against 65 percent of Orthodox respondents believe that the government was "right" to open negotiations with the PLO. Or again, 90 percent of Conservative Jews, 94 percent of Reform Jews, and 90 percent of the "Just Jewish" as against 73 percent of Orthodox respondents believe that Israel-PLO recognition is "positive" from Israel's point of view. And 72 percent of Conservative Jews, 80 percent of Reform Jews, and 77 percent of the

“Just Jewish” as against 51 percent of Orthodox respondents are “for” the general Palestinian autonomy plan.

In addition, as household income increases, respondents are more likely to support the government’s handling of the peace negotiations (under \$30,000, 72 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 81 percent; \$50-74,999, 90 percent; \$75,000 and over, 91 percent); to believe that the government was right to open negotiations with the PLO (under \$30,000, 80 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 86 percent; \$50-74,999, 91 percent; \$75,000 and over, 95 percent); to believe that mutual recognition was positive (under \$30,000, 83 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 90 percent; \$50-74,999, 94 percent; \$75,000 and over, 94 percent); and to be “for” the Palestinian autonomy plan (under \$30,000, 63 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 71 percent; \$50-74,999, 84 percent; \$75,000 and over, 87 percent).

Respondents with more education are more likely than those with less education to support the government’s handling of the peace negotiations (high school or less, 74 percent; some college, 81 percent; college graduate, 84 percent; some graduate school or more, 92 percent); to believe that the government was right to open negotiations with the PLO (high school or less, 78 percent; some college, 89 percent; college graduate, 87 percent; some graduate school or more, 92 percent); to believe that mutual recognition was positive (high school or less, 85 percent; some college, 91 percent; college graduate, 89 percent; some graduate school or more, 94 percent); and to be “for” the Palestinian autonomy plan (high school or less, 65 percent; some college, 75 percent; college graduate, 74 percent; some graduate school or more, 83 percent).

Those respondents who have visited Israel tend to be at least somewhat less likely to express support than those who have not visited Israel. Thus they are less likely to support the government’s handling of the peace negotiations (visited, 80 percent; not visited, 86 percent); to believe that the government was right in opening negotiations with the PLO (visited, 82 percent; not visited, 90 percent); to believe that mutual recognition is positive (visited, 88 percent; not visited, 92 percent); and to be “for” the autonomy plan (visited, 70 percent; not visited, 77 percent). Further, respondents who report that they feel “very close” to Israel tend to be at least somewhat less likely to express support than those who feel “fairly close” and “very/fairly distant” on a number of the items. Thus they are less likely to support the government’s handling of the peace negotiations (very close,

76 percent; fairly close, 88 percent; fairly/very distant, 83 percent); to believe that the government was right in opening negotiations with the PLO (very close, 80 percent; fairly close, 90 percent; fairly/very distant, 89 percent); to believe that mutual recognition is positive (very close, 86 percent; fairly close, 93 percent; fairly/very distant, 89 percent); and to be "for" the autonomy plan (very close, 68 percent; fairly close, 77 percent; fairly/very distant, 80 percent).

Strong and consistent differences in support for the accord do not emerge on the basis of gender and age. Thus men are somewhat more likely than women to support the government's handling of the peace negotiations (men, 86 percent; women, 81 percent) and to be "for" the autonomy plan (men, 78 percent; women, 71 percent), but men and women are about equally likely to believe that the government was "right" to open negotiations with the PLO (men, 89 percent; women, 86 percent) and that Israel-PLO recognition is "positive" (men, 91 percent; women, 90 percent). Similarly, consistent age differences do not emerge in support for the government's handling of peace negotiations (under 40, 82 percent; 40-59, 88 percent; 60 and over, 81 percent), in the belief that the government was "right" to open negotiations with the PLO (under 40, 86 percent; 40-59, 90 percent; 60 and over, 86 percent), in being "for" the autonomy plan (under 40, 75 percent; 40-59, 78 percent; 60 and over, 70 percent), or in feeling that Israel-PLO recognition is "positive" (under 40, 89 percent; 40-59, 94 percent; 60 and over, 88 percent).

In terms of attitudes toward possible Israeli policies, support for continued Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza tends to be stronger among the Orthodox (66 percent) than among Conservative (42 percent) and Reform Jews (42 percent) and the "Just Jewish" (39 percent); stronger among women (49 percent) than men (36 percent); stronger among younger respondents (under 40, 47 percent; 40-59, 42 percent; 60 and over, 38 percent); stronger among respondents with lower household incomes (under \$30,000, 48 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 48 percent; \$50-74,999, 44 percent; \$75,000 and over, 32 percent); stronger among those who have not attended graduate school (high school or less, 48 percent; some college, 51 percent; college graduate, 42 percent; some graduate school or more, 32 percent); and somewhat stronger among those who have not visited Israel (visited, 38 percent; not visited, 45 percent).

Support for a Palestinian state also varies among certain demo-

graphic subgroups, with women less in favor of the idea than men (51 versus 63 percent), the Orthodox less in favor than respondents from other denominations (Orthodox, 33 percent; Conservative, 57 percent; Reform, 63 percent; "Just Jewish," 56 percent), those who have visited Israel somewhat less in favor than those who have not (visited, 48 percent; not visited, 61 percent), and those who say they feel "very close" to Israel somewhat less in favor than others (very close, 47 percent; fairly close, 64 percent; very/fairly distant, 55 percent).

Finally, rejection of compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction tends to be at least somewhat stronger among Orthodox and Conservative Jews (Orthodox, 77 percent; Conservative, 67 percent; Reform, 57 percent; "Just Jewish," 56 percent), among synagogue members (members, 68 percent; nonmembers, 54 percent), among higher-income respondents (under \$30,000, 57 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 56 percent; \$50-74,999, 68 percent; \$75,000 and over, 66 percent), among younger respondents (under 40, 70 percent; 40-59, 62 percent; 60 and over, 53 percent), among those who feel close to Israel (very close, 73 percent; fairly close, 61 percent; fairly/very distant, 50 percent), among those who have visited Israel (visited, 74 percent; not visited, 56 percent), among those who belong to a Jewish organization (members, 68 percent; nonmembers, 58 percent), among those who are unmarried (unmarried, 67 percent; intermarried, 56 percent), and among respondents with at least some college education (high school or less, 53 percent; some college, 63 percent; college graduate, 66 percent; some graduate school or more, 64 percent).

Similar subgroup patterns emerge on the items relating to the PLO and the Arabs. For example, the Orthodox are less likely than others to trust the PLO to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorism (Orthodox, 20 percent; Conservative, 32 percent; Reform, 36 percent; "Just Jewish," 36 percent); women less than men (29 percent versus 39 percent); those with lower incomes less than those with higher incomes (under \$30,000, 28 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 31 percent; \$50-74,999, 37 percent; \$75,000 and over, 38 percent); those with less education less than those with more education (high school or less, 25 percent; some college, 30 percent; college graduate, 34 percent; some graduate school or more, 43 percent); those who feel "very close" to Israel somewhat less than others (very close, 28 percent; fairly close, 35 percent; fairly/very distant, 37 percent);

and those who have been to Israel somewhat less than those who have not (visited, 29 percent; not visited, 36 percent).

Similarly, the Orthodox are more likely than others to believe that "the PLO is determined to destroy Israel" (Orthodox, 58 percent; Conservative, 34 percent; Reform, 30 percent; "Just Jewish," 30 percent); women more than men (39 percent versus 29 percent); those with lower incomes more than others (under \$30,000, 47 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 39 percent; \$50-74,999, 26 percent; \$75,000 and over, 22 percent); those with less education more than those with more education (high school or less, 44 percent; some college, 39 percent; college graduate, 30 percent; some graduate school or more, 25 percent); and those who feel "very close" to Israel more than others (very close, 42 percent; fairly close, 30 percent; fairly/very distant, 31 percent).

Finally, the Orthodox are more likely to believe that "the goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel" (Orthodox, 65 percent; Conservative, 42 percent; Reform, 36 percent; "Just Jewish," 42 percent); women more than men (46 percent versus 37 percent), those with lower incomes more than others (under \$30,000, 52 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 46 percent; \$50-74,999, 32 percent; \$75,000 and over, 36 percent); those with less education more than those with more education (high school or less, 50 percent; some college, 43 percent; college graduate, 38 percent; some graduate school or more, 38 percent); those who feel "very close" to Israel more than others (very close, 49 percent; fairly close, 40 percent; fairly/very distant, 37 percent); and those who have been to Israel more than those who have not (visited, 47 percent; not visited, 39 percent).

Comparing American Jews and Israelis

Comparison of the American and Israeli surveys is somewhat complicated by the fact that the response "not sure" was accepted in the American survey but not in the Israeli survey. Except where noted, all comparisons are based on the obtained American figures. The exclusion of the "not sure" responses from the American data, and recalculation based on those respondents who express an opinion, typically result in trends in the same direction but of different magnitude.

While both American Jews and Israelis show widespread support for

the Israel-PLO accord, American Jews are more likely than Israelis to support it. Thus 84 percent of American Jews as against 63 percent of Israelis support the Israeli government's handling of negotiations; 87 percent of American Jews as against 64 percent of Israelis say that the government was right to open negotiations with the PLO; and 90 percent of American Jews as against 71 percent of Israelis consider Israel-PLO recognition a positive development. Overall, 75 percent of American Jews are for the autonomy plan and 13 percent are against it, whereas 62 percent of Israelis are for the plan and 39 percent are against it.

While comparable percentages of American Jews and Israelis seem to support the plan as it applies to Jericho (American Jews: for, 64 percent; against, 17 percent; not sure, 20 percent; Israelis: for, 59 percent; against, 42 percent), exclusion of the "not sure" response results in somewhat greater American support (for, 79 percent; against, 21 percent) than Israeli support. However, American Jews and Israelis express similar levels of support for extending autonomy to other areas in the West Bank (American Jews: for, 43 percent; against, 34 percent; not sure, 23 percent; Israelis: for, 50 percent; against, 50 percent). And while Israelis seem more likely to support the plan as it applies to Gaza (American Jews: for, 69 percent; against, 15 percent; not sure, 16 percent; Israelis: for, 81 percent; against, 19 percent), among American Jews with an opinion, support is at 82 percent—comparable to the Israel figure.

American Jews are more likely than Israelis to believe that the Palestinian autonomy plan "increases the chance for peace with the Arabs" (73 percent versus 56 percent), and less likely to believe that it "increases the possibility of another war" (17 percent versus 33 percent). American Jews are much less likely than Israelis to predict a war in the near future (20 percent versus 58 percent). Further, Americans are much less likely to think that terrorism against Israel will strengthen (38 percent versus 74 percent). However, more comparable percentages of American Jews and Israelis expect violence between Palestinians with different political views (81 percent and 88 percent, respectively), and between Jews with different views (55 percent and 62 percent, respectively).

While similar proportions of American Jews and Israelis believe that the plan will lead to a Palestinian state, American Jews are more likely to favor and much less likely to oppose such a state (American Jews: favor, 57 percent; oppose, 30 percent; Israelis: favor, 40 percent; oppose, 59 per-

cent). American Jews are also much more likely to support compromise on the status of Jerusalem (American Jews, 30 percent; Israelis, 11 percent). However, similar percentages of American Jews and Israelis support giving up "none" or "only a small part" of the West Bank (American Jews, 38 percent; Israelis, 48 percent) and the Golan Heights (American Jews, 57 percent; Israelis, 60 percent), and favor continued settlement in the West Bank (American Jews, 43 percent; Israelis, 46 percent). These last two comparisons are even closer when the figures for American Jews are based on those with an opinion.

While it appears that Israelis are more likely than American Jews to believe that the PLO will honor its agreements and refrain from terrorism (51 percent versus 34 percent), the large number of "not sure" responses from American Jews (25 percent) hampers the comparison. Indeed, omission of the "not sure" responses increases the American figure to a more comparable 45 percent. And while it appears that American Jews are somewhat less likely than Israelis to believe that the goal of the Arabs is to destroy Israel (42 percent versus 53 percent), similar percentages disagree (50 percent and 47 percent); clear comparison is again hampered because "not sure" responses were accepted from American Jews (9 percent answer "not sure"), but not from Israelis. Indeed, among American Jews who express an opinion, 46 percent agree.

American Jews and Attachment to Israel

General Results

In addition to examining reaction to the Israel-PLO accord, the survey of American Jews explored attachment to Israel. It is evident that personal feelings toward Israel on the part of American Jews are quite strong, despite the fact that only a minority have been to Israel or describe themselves as Zionists.

Thus 75 percent of American Jews report that they feel close to Israel (very close, 27 percent; fairly close, 48 percent), while nearly one-quarter feel distant (fairly distant, 20 percent; very distant, 4 percent); 1 percent are not sure. In addition, as "compared to 3 or 4 years ago," 79 percent report feeling "about the same" now about Israel; 17 percent feel closer; and 3 percent feel more distant. Indeed, comparisons with earlier data suggest

that American Jews may now feel somewhat closer to Israel than in the mid- to late 1980s—continuing a trend that was evident in a 1991 survey. Thus, in the present survey, 75 percent of respondents report feeling close to Israel, while 24 percent report feeling distant, with 1 percent not sure. Similarly, in the 1991 survey, 72 percent felt close to Israel and 25 percent felt distant. In contrast, in a 1989 survey, only 62 percent felt close to Israel while 31 percent felt distant, and in a 1986 survey, 62 percent felt either very or fairly close to Israel, while 33 percent felt “not very close.”

An overwhelming majority (89 percent) of American Jews report following the news about Israel “very closely” (39 percent) or “somewhat closely” (50 percent); 12 percent answer “not closely.” Large majorities of American Jews agree with the statements “Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew” (agree, 79 percent; disagree, 19 percent; not sure, 2 percent) and “If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life” (agree, 68 percent; disagree, 28 percent; not sure, 3 percent). Responses for these two items do not appear to have shifted steadily over time. Thus, while the percentage who agree that “Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew” is at a high point (1993: 79 percent; 1991, 68 percent; 1989, 73 percent; 1986, 63 percent), the percentage who disagree has remained fairly stable (1993, 19 percent; 1991, 19 percent; 1989, 15 percent; 1986, 24 percent); the large drop in “not sure” responses in the current survey (1993, 2 percent; 1991, 13 percent; 1989, 13 percent; 1986, 14 percent) may have contributed, in part, to the higher “agree” figure. (Among respondents who express an opinion, the percentage who agree increased after 1986 and has been more stable for the last few years: 1986, 72 percent; 1989, 83 percent; 1991, 78 percent; 1993, 81 percent.) Similarly, while the percentage who disagree with the statement “If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life” seems to have increased somewhat (1993, 28 percent; 1991, 19 percent; 1989, 17 percent; 1986, 21 percent), the percentage agreeing has also increased slightly (1993, 68 percent; 1991, 65 percent; 1989, 65 percent; 1986, 61 percent). Both increases may have resulted, at least in part, from the decreased percentage of “not sure” responses in the current survey (1993, 3 percent; 1991, 17 percent; 1989, 18 percent; 1986, 18 percent). (Again, among respondents with a definite opinion the percentages agreeing are as follows: 1986, 74 percent; 1989, 79 percent; 1991, 77 percent;

1993, 71 percent.)

Only about a third of American Jews have been to Israel, 21 percent once, 12 percent more than once; 67 percent have never been there.

Only 29 percent of American Jews consider themselves Zionists, as against 69 percent who do not; 3 percent are not sure.

Turning to the perception that American Jews have of the relationship of non-Jews to Israel, concern is expressed in a variety of ways. At the same time, larger numbers feel secure that the United States will continue to support Israel. Thus approximately half agree with the statements "When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive" (agree, 49 percent; disagree, 47 percent; not sure, 4 percent); "The criticism of Israel that we hear derives mainly from anti-Semitism" (agree, 56 percent; disagree, 40 percent; not sure, 4 percent); and "The American news media use a double standard in judging Israel more harshly than the Arab countries" (agree, 54 percent; disagree, 42 percent; not sure, 5 percent). Nevertheless, a majority disagree with the statement "I am worried that the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel" (agree, 23 percent; disagree, 75 percent; not sure, 2 percent).

Again, comparing the present survey with earlier fieldings of the same items is somewhat complicated, since respondents in the current poll were less likely to answer "not sure"; this may have resulted from differences in methodology, not just from changes in public opinion. However, where comparisons are possible and appropriate, the data suggest that, although large numbers of American Jews voice concern about Israel in the present survey, they may have become less insecure about non-Jewish attitudes toward Israel.

Thus respondents in the present survey were about evenly split on the statement "When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive" (agree, 49 percent; disagree, 47 percent; not sure, 4 percent), whereas respondents in a 1989 survey were more likely to agree (57 percent) than to disagree (28 percent), with 15 percent not sure, and those in a 1986 survey were also more likely to agree (46 percent) than to disagree (33 percent), with 21 percent not sure. Similarly, while respondents in the current poll were more likely to agree than to disagree that "The American news media use a double standard in judging Israel more harshly than the Arab countries" (agree, 54 percent; disagree, 42 percent; not sure, 5 percent), respondents in a 1991 survey were much

more likely to agree (62 percent) than to disagree (19 percent), with 19 percent not sure. And respondents in the current poll were much more likely to disagree than to agree with the statement "I am worried that the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel" (agree, 23 percent; disagree, 75 percent; not sure, 2 percent), whereas respondents in a 1989 poll were much more likely to agree (57 percent) than to disagree (32 percent), with 11 percent not sure, and those in a 1986 survey were about as likely to agree (40 percent) as to disagree (43 percent), with 17 percent not sure.

A majority of respondents disagree that "American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel" (agree, 32 percent; disagree, 65 percent; not sure, 2 percent). (This finding is consistent with earlier fieldings of the same item in 1986, 1989, and 1991.)

Respondents in the current survey were asked to select from a list of four the main reason that the United States supports Israel, and a plurality select "because Israel is a strategic asset" (44 percent); many others choose "because of shared values such as freedom and democracy" (34 percent). Seventeen percent select "because of American Jewish influence"; 2 percent select "because of poor relations between America and the Arabs"; 3 percent are not sure. These figures do not vary greatly from those obtained in a 1991 fielding of the same item.

Finally, a strong majority see a need for a continuing U.S. role in the Middle East peace process (yes, 92 percent; no, 7 percent; not sure, 1 percent). Those who answered "yes" were asked to indicate whether each of four roles was appropriate for the United States. The responses are as follows: "providing substantial economic aid to the region" (yes, 76 percent; no, 22 percent; not sure, 3 percent); "combating Islamic fundamentalist forces" (yes, 63 percent; no, 31 percent; not sure, 6 percent); "brokering a deal between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights" (yes, 72 percent; no, 24 percent; not sure, 5 percent); and "encouraging further compromise between Israel and the Palestinians" (yes, 74 percent; no, 23 percent; not sure, 3 percent).

Subgroup Differences

Various subgroups of American Jews express greater or lesser attachment to Israel. Overall, respondents who are Orthodox (and sometimes Conservative), who are older, who are affiliated with synagogues and Jewish

organizations, who are unmarried, and who have visited Israel tend to be more likely to report close feelings toward Israel on a variety of measures.

With regard to denomination, Orthodox (and sometimes Conservative) respondents are the most likely to report feeling "very close" to Israel (Orthodox, 65 percent; Conservative, 36 percent; Reform, 15 percent; "Just Jewish," 20 percent); to follow the news about Israel "very closely" (Orthodox, 63 percent; Conservative, 48 percent; Reform, 31 percent; "Just Jewish," 29 percent); to have visited Israel (Orthodox, 60 percent; Conservative, 38 percent; Reform, 26 percent; "Just Jewish," 28 percent) and to consider themselves Zionists (Orthodox, 44 percent; Conservative, 36 percent; Reform, 22 percent; "Just Jewish," 24 percent). Again, Orthodox and Conservative Jews are at least somewhat more likely to agree with the statements "Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew" (Orthodox, 87 percent; Conservative, 92 percent; Reform, 78 percent; "Just Jewish," 60 percent) and "If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life" (Orthodox, 85 percent; Conservative, 80 percent; Reform, 63 percent; "Just Jewish," 55 percent).

Similarly, synagogue members are more likely than nonmembers to feel "very close" to Israel (members, 37 percent; nonmembers, 15 percent), to follow the news about Israel "very closely" (members, 50 percent; nonmembers, 24 percent), to have been to Israel (members, 43 percent; nonmembers, 21 percent), and to consider themselves Zionists (members, 36 percent; nonmembers, 19 percent). Synagogue members are also more likely to indicate that "Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew" (members, 87 percent; nonmembers, 69 percent), and that Israel's destruction would be a great personal tragedy (members, 78 percent; nonmembers, 57 percent).

Respondents who belong to Jewish organizations (other than a synagogue or a temple) are more likely than the organizationally unaffiliated to follow the news about Israel "very closely" (affiliated, 55 percent; unaffiliated, 28 percent); to have visited Israel (affiliated, 46 percent; unaffiliated, 24 percent); to report feeling "very close" to Israel (affiliated, 43 percent; unaffiliated, 17 percent); to consider themselves Zionists (affiliated, 40 percent; unaffiliated, 22 percent); to say that caring about Israel is an important part of their being Jewish (affiliated, 90 percent; unaffiliated, 72 percent); and to feel that the destruction of Israel would be a

great personal tragedy (affiliated, 81 percent; unaffiliated, 60 percent).

Inmarried respondents are more likely than the intermarried to follow the news about Israel "very closely" (inmarried, 46 percent; intermarried, 16 percent); to have visited Israel (inmarried, 40 percent; intermarried, 9 percent); to report feeling "very close" (inmarried, 32 percent; intermarried, 10 percent) or "fairly close" (inmarried, 52 percent; intermarried, 34 percent) to Israel; to consider themselves Zionists (inmarried, 30 percent; intermarried, 18 percent); to say that caring about Israel is an important part of their being Jewish (inmarried, 82 percent; intermarried, 66 percent); and to feel that the destruction of Israel would be a great personal tragedy (inmarried, 75 percent; intermarried, 43 percent).

Respondents who have visited Israel are more likely than others to follow the news about Israel "very closely" (visited, 61 percent; not visited, 28 percent); to report feeling "very close" to Israel (visited, 50 percent; not visited, 16 percent); to consider themselves Zionists (visited, 43 percent; not visited, 22 percent); to say that caring about Israel is an important part of their being Jewish (visited, 87 percent; not visited, 75 percent); and to feel that the destruction of Israel would be a great personal tragedy (visited, 82 percent; not visited, 62 percent).

Older respondents tend to be more likely to feel "very close" to Israel (under 40, 22 percent; 40-59, 27 percent; 60 and over, 34 percent), to follow the news about Israel "very closely" (under 40, 31 percent; 40-59, 37 percent; 60 and over, 50 percent), and to have been to Israel (under 40, 31 percent; 40-59, 27 percent; 60 and over, 42 percent), although they are somewhat less likely than the youngest respondents to consider themselves Zionists (under 40, 32 percent; 40-59, 28 percent; 60 and over, 25 percent). Older respondents are more likely to agree that "If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life" (under 40, 59 percent; 40-59, 71 percent; 60 and over, 78 percent). Substantial differences do not emerge for the item "Caring about Israel is an important part of my being a Jew" (under 40, 77 percent; 40-59, 79 percent; 60 and over, 81 percent).

A number of subgroup differences emerge for the items tapping American Jews' perceptions of Israel vis-à-vis the non-Jewish community. Thus the belief that "When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive" is at least somewhat stronger among older respondents (under 40, 43 percent; 40-59, 50 percent; 60 and

over, 55 percent), among those with lower incomes (under \$30,000, 56 percent; \$30-49,999, 47 percent; \$50-74,999, 45 percent; \$75,000 and over, 48 percent), and among those who are inmarried (inmarried, 52 percent; intermarried, 41 percent).

Agreement with the statement "The criticism of Israel that we hear derives mainly from anti-Semitism" is more likely among respondents with lower incomes (under \$30,000, 64 percent; \$30-49,999, 59 percent; \$50-74,999, 55 percent; \$75,000 and over, 46 percent), among respondents with no graduate-school experience (high school or less, 65 percent; some college, 62 percent; college graduate, 56 percent; some graduate school or more, 46 percent), among women (men, 51 percent; women, 61 percent), and among respondents who have not visited Israel (visited, 51 percent; not visited, 59 percent).

Belief that the American media use a double standard in judging Israel is more likely among the Orthodox (Orthodox, 82 percent; Conservative, 58 percent; Reform, 49 percent; "Just Jewish," 46 percent), older respondents (under 40, 49 percent; 40-59, 49 percent; 60 and over, 64 percent), respondents with lower incomes (under \$30,000, 62 percent; \$30-49,999, 54 percent; \$50-74,999, 51 percent; \$75,000 and over, 49 percent), synagogue members (members, 62 percent; nonmembers, 43 percent), members of Jewish organizations (members, 68 percent; nonmembers, 44 percent), inmarried respondents (inmarried, 58 percent; intermarried, 38 percent), respondents who feel "very close" to Israel (very close, 77 percent; fairly close, 49 percent; very/fairly distant, 36 percent), and among respondents who have visited Israel (visited, 74 percent; not visited, 44 percent).

Concern that the United States may stop being a firm ally of Israel is at least somewhat more likely among the Orthodox (Orthodox, 45 percent; Conservative, 25 percent; Reform, 17 percent; "Just Jewish," 22 percent), women (men, 20 percent; women, 26 percent), synagogue members (members, 26 percent; nonmembers, 19 percent), members of Jewish organizations (members, 27 percent; nonmembers, 20 percent), and among those who feel "very close" to Israel (very close, 29 percent; fairly close, 22 percent; very/fairly distant, 18 percent).

Finally, the belief that American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of Israel is stronger among Orthodox and Conservative Jews (Orthodox, 48 percent; Conservative, 41 percent; Reform, 26 percent; "Just

Jewish," 25 percent), among respondents with lower incomes (under \$30,000, 43 percent; \$30-49,999, 34 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 30 percent; \$75,000 and over, 20 percent), among older respondents (under 40, 24 percent; 40-59, 28 percent; 60 and over, 46 percent), among the inmarried (inmarried, 33 percent; intermarried, 21 percent), and among those with less education (high school or less, 40 percent; some college, 37 percent; college graduate, 32 percent; some graduate school or more, 24 percent); and somewhat stronger among respondents who feel "very close" to Israel (very close, 40 percent; fairly close, 28 percent; very/fairly distant, 32 percent), among women (men, 29 percent; women, 35 percent), and among synagogue members (members, 35 percent; nonmembers, 29 percent).

Summary and Conclusion

The results of the 1993 survey of American Jews highlight widespread support for the Israel-PLO accord. In this regard, the vast majority of American Jews support the Israeli government in its negotiations with the PLO, and look upon mutual Israel-PLO recognition as a positive development for Israel. Moreover, a significant majority agree that Israel should trade land for peace, up from earlier figures for the same item. American Jews are also quite optimistic about the outcome of the autonomy plan, tending to predict peace for Israel.

However, large majorities of American Jews expect violence between Palestinians with differing political views, as well as between Israelis with differing political views. In addition, support for some specific elements of the autonomy plan tends to be at least somewhat lower than support for the plan in general. Moreover, the sample is split on the issue of continued Jewish settlements in the West Bank, while a majority reject compromise on the status of Jerusalem. A significant minority of American Jews believe that the PLO cannot be trusted and is determined to destroy Israel. (However, where comparisons are available, concern about the PLO is voiced by fewer American Jews than in earlier years.) A large minority also believe that the goal of the Arabs is to destroy Israel.

While only minorities of American Jews have been to Israel and describe themselves as Zionists, a large majority express strong attachment to Israel. Indeed, the percentage of American Jews saying that they feel close to Israel is at a high point. Among specific subgroups of American Jews, it

is Orthodox (and sometimes Conservative) Jews, older Jews, unmarried Jews, Jews who belong to synagogues or Jewish organizations, and Jews who have visited Israel who feel closest to Israel.

Table 1

“Overall, do you support or oppose the Israeli government’s current handling of the peace negotiations with the Arabs?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Support	Oppose	Not sure
Total	84	9	8
Sex			
Male	86	7	6
Female	81	10	9
Age			
Under 40	82	11	7
40-59	88	7	6
60+	81	8	11
Income			
<\$30,000	72	15	13
\$30,000-49,999	81	10	9
\$50,000-74,999	90	3	7
\$75,000+	91	6	3
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	74	13	14
Some college	81	10	9
College graduate	84	9	7
Some grad. school or more	92	4	4
Denomination			
Orthodox	52	32	15
Conservative	84	9	7
Reform	90	5	5
Just Jewish	83	7	11
Synagogue member			
Yes	81	10	9
No	87	6	7
Jewish organization member			
Yes	82	11	6
No	84	7	9
Visited Israel			
Yes	80	12	9
No	86	7	7
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	76	16	9
Fairly close	88	6	6
Fairly/very distant	83	7	10
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	84	10	7
Spouse not Jewish	86	7	8

Table 2

“Was the Israeli government right or wrong in opening negotiations with the PLO in order to reach an agreement on Palestinian autonomy?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Right	Wrong	Not sure
Total	87	8	5
Sex			
Male	89	6	5
Female	86	9	5
Age			
Under 40	86	10	4
40-59	90	6	4
60+	86	7	7
Income ^a			
<\$30,000	80	10	9
\$30,000-49,999	86	10	4
\$50,000-74,999	91	6	4
\$75,000+	95	4	1
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	78	11	11
Some college	89	8	3
College graduate	87	6	7
Some grad. school or more	92	5	2
Denomination			
Orthodox	65	27	8
Conservative	88	8	4
Reform	91	4	5
Just Jewish	86	7	6
Synagogue member			
Yes	86	9	5
No	88	7	5
Jewish organization member			
Yes	87	9	5
No	87	7	5
Visited Israel			
Yes	82	10	8
No	90	7	4
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	80	14	6
Fairly close	90	5	5
Fairly/very distant	89	6	5
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	87	9	5
Spouse not Jewish	89	6	5

Table 3

“Israel and the PLO have officially recognized each other. Do you think this is a positive or negative development from Israel’s point of view?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Positive	Negative	Not sure
Total	90	7	3
Sex			
Male	91	6	3
Female	90	7	3
Age			
Under 40	89	8	3
40-59	94	4	2
60+	88	8	4
Income			
<\$30,000	83	12	4
\$30,000-49,999	90	6	4
\$50,000-74,999	94	4	2
\$75,000+	94	5	2
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	85	10	5
Some college	91	6	2
College graduate	89	8	3
Some grad. school or more	94	4	2
Denomination			
Orthodox	73	23	4
Conservative	90	7	2
Reform	94	4	2
Just Jewish	90	5	5
Synagogue member			
Yes	89	8	3
No	92	5	3
Jewish organization member			
Yes	90	7	3
No	91	6	3
Visited Israel			
Yes	88	9	3
No	92	6	3
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	86	10	4
Fairly close	93	5	2
Fairly/very distant	89	6	5
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	90	8	3
Spouse not Jewish	92	5	3

Table 4

“Israel and the PLO have agreed on a plan for Palestinian autonomy that will begin in Gaza and Jericho, and at a later stage will extend autonomy to other areas in the West Bank. From what you know so far, are you for or against this plan?” (in percents)

Subgroup	For	Against	Not sure
Total	75	13	13
Sex			
Male	78	10	11
Female	71	15	14
Age			
Under 40	75	16	9
40-59	78	9	13
60+	70	13	17
Income			
<\$30,000	63	18	19
\$30,000-49,999	71	15	14
\$50,000-74,999	84	7	9
\$75,000+	87	7	6
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	65	17	18
Some college	75	14	11
College graduate	74	15	11
Some grad. school or more	83	7	11
Denomination			
Orthodox	51	41	8
Conservative	72	13	15
Reform	80	7	12
Just Jewish	77	12	11
Synagogue member			
Yes	73	15	12
No	77	10	13
Jewish organization member			
Yes	75	14	12
No	75	12	13
Visited Israel			
Yes	70	17	13
No	77	10	12
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	68	21	11
Fairly close	77	10	13
Fairly/very distant	80	8	13
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	74	13	13
Spouse not Jewish	83	7	10

Table 5

“Do you feel that Jewish settlements should continue to be established in the West Bank and Gaza at this time?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Yes	No	Not sure
Total	43	47	11
Sex			
Male	36	55	9
Female	49	39	12
Age			
Under 40	47	43	10
40-59	42	49	10
60+	38	49	13
Income			
<\$30,000	48	40	12
\$30,000-49,999	48	39	13
\$50,000-74,999	44	48	8
\$75,000+	32	59	9
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	48	38	14
Some college	51	38	11
College graduate	42	46	12
Some grad. school or more	32	59	9
Denomination			
Orthodox	66	25	8
Conservative	42	50	8
Reform	42	45	14
Just Jewish	39	51	11
Synagogue member			
Yes	43	48	9
No	43	45	13
Jewish organization member			
Yes	42	49	10
No	43	46	11
Visited Israel			
Yes	38	53	9
No	45	43	11
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	44	47	9
Fairly close	42	50	8
Fairly/very distant	43	39	18
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	41	50	10
Spouse not Jewish	48	41	11

Table 6

“Given the current situation, do you favor or oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Favor	Oppose	Not sure
Total	57	30	13
Sex			
Male	63	26	11
Female	51	33	16
Age			
Under 40	54	34	12
40-59	57	29	14
60+	61	25	14
Income			
<\$30,000	52	33	15
\$30,000-49,999	56	33	11
\$50,000-74,999	63	23	14
\$75,000+	57	31	12
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	58	31	11
Some college	58	31	12
College graduate	56	29	15
Some grad. school or more	59	26	14
Denomination			
Orthodox	33	60	7
Conservative	57	31	12
Reform	63	23	14
Just Jewish	56	28	16
Synagogue member			
Yes	55	34	11
No	60	24	16
Jewish organization member			
Yes	54	33	14
No	59	27	13
Visited Israel			
Yes	48	38	13
No	61	25	13
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	47	41	13
Fairly close	64	25	11
Fairly/very distant	55	26	18
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	58	30	11
Spouse not Jewish	58	22	20

Table 7

“In the framework of a permanent peace with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Yes	No	Not sure
Total	30	62	8
Sex			
Male	30	62	8
Female	30	61	9
Age			
Under 40	23	70	8
40-59	31	62	7
60+	37	53	10
Income			
<\$30,000	35	57	8
\$30,000-49,999	33	56	11
\$50,000-74,999	25	68	7
\$75,000+	26	66	8
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	36	53	11
Some college	30	63	7
College graduate	28	66	6
Some grad. school or more	27	64	9
Denomination			
Orthodox	18	77	4
Conservative	26	67	7
Reform	33	57	10
Just Jewish	35	56	9
Synagogue member			
Yes	24	68	8
No	37	54	9
Jewish organization member			
Yes	25	68	8
No	33	58	9
Visited Israel			
Yes	18	74	8
No	36	56	9
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	20	73	7
Fairly close	31	61	8
Fairly/very distant	39	50	11
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	25	67	7
Spouse not Jewish	35	56	10

Table 8
“Can the PLO be relied upon to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorist activity against Israel?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Yes	No	Not sure
Total	34	42	25
Sex			
Male	39	36	25
Female	29	47	25
Age			
Under 40	35	47	18
40-59	36	33	31
60+	30	43	27
Income			
<\$30,000	28	50	22
\$30,000-49,999	31	44	25
\$50,000-74,999	37	39	24
\$75,000+	38	33	28
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	25	50	26
Some college	30	45	25
College graduate	34	41	25
Some grad. school or more	43	34	24
Denomination			
Orthodox	20	65	15
Conservative	32	44	24
Reform	36	36	28
Just Jewish	36	39	25
Synagogue member			
Yes	31	43	26
No	37	40	24
Jewish organization member			
Yes	32	44	25
No	35	40	25
Visited Israel			
Yes	29	44	27
No	36	41	24
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	28	48	24
Fairly close	35	39	25
Fairly/very distant	*37	38	25
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	33	41	26
Spouse not Jewish	37	37	27

Table 9
"The PLO is determined to destroy Israel." (in percents)

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	34	57	10
Sex			
Male	29	63	8
Female	39	50	11
Age			
Under 40	34	59	7
40-59	27	62	12
60+	39	50	10
Income			
<\$30,000	47	46	7
\$30,000-49,999	39	53	9
\$50,000-74,999	26	64	10
\$75,000+	22	67	12
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	44	46	11
Some college	39	53	8
College graduate	30	61	9
Some grad. school or more	25	64	11
Denomination			
Orthodox	58	35	7
Conservative	34	54	12
Reform	30	61	8
Just Jewish	30	61	9
Synagogue member			
Yes	36	55	9
No	31	59	10
Jewish organization member			
Yes	35	55	10
No	33	58	9
Visited Israel			
Yes	35	54	10
No	33	58	9
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	42	47	11
Fairly close	30	61	8
Fairly/very distant	31	59	10
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	33	57	10
Spouse not Jewish	33	59	7

Table 10

“The goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel.” (in percents)

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	42	50	9
Sex			
Male	37	54	9
Female	46	45	9
Age			
Under 40	42	53	5
40-59	36	54	10
60+	46	41	13
Income			
<\$30,000	52	41	6
\$30,000-49,999	46	46	8
\$50,000-74,999	32	60	8
\$75,000+	36	53	11
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	50	39	11
Some college	43	51	6
College graduate	38	54	8
Some grad. school or more	38	53	9
Denomination			
Orthodox	65	30	6
Conservative	42	49	9
Reform	36	56	8
Just Jewish	42	48	10
Synagogue member			
Yes	42	48	9
No	41	51	8
Jewish organization member			
Yes	42	48	10
No	41	51	8
Visited Israel			
Yes	47	41	13
No	39	54	7
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	49	38	12
Fairly close	40	54	6
Fairly/very distant	37*	55	8
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	43	48	10
Spouse not Jewish	40	55	5

Table 11
“How close do you feel to Israel?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Very close	Fairly close	Fairly distant	Very distant	Not sure
Total	27	48	20	4	1
Sex					
Male	27	48	21	3	1
Female	28	48	19	5	1
Age					
Under 40	22	46	26	5	1
40-59	27	48	22	3	1
60+	34	51	11	3	2
Income					
<\$30,000	28	50	17	4	1
\$30,000-49,999	27	46	21	4	1
\$50,000-74,999	23	48	23	5	1
\$75,000+	30	50	17	2	1
Education					
H.S. grad. or less	29	49	16	5	2
Some college	27	45	21	5	1
College graduate	27	45	24	4	1
Some grad. school or more	27	53	17	2	1
Denomination					
Orthodox	65	31	4	0	0
Conservative	36	53	9	1	1
Reform	15	53	25	5	2
Just Jewish	20	41	31	7	1
Synagogue member					
Yes	37	49	12	1	1
No	15	47	29	7	1
Jewish organization member					
Yes	43	47	8	1	1
No	17	49	28	5	1
Visited Israel					
Yes	50	40	8	1	1
No	16	52	26	5	1
Closeness to Israel					
Very close	100	0	0	0	0
Fairly close	0	100	0	0	0
Fairly/very distant	0	0	84	16	0
Marital status (if married)					
Spouse Jewish	32	52	13	2	1
Spouse not Jewish	10	34	44	11	1

Table 12**"How closely do you follow the news about Israel?" (in percents)**

Subgroup	Very closely	Somewhat closely	Not closely	Not sure
Total	39	50	12	0
Sex				
Male	41	49	9	0
Female	36	50	14	0
Age				
Under 40	31	53	16	0
40-59	37	52	11	0
60+	50	43	7	0
Income				
<\$30,000	35	53	12	0
\$30,000-49,999	38	47	15	0
\$50,000-74,999	36	52	12	0
\$75,000+	45	48	7	0
Education				
H.S. grad. or less	39	51	10	0
Some college	31	54	15	0
College graduate	36	48	16	0
Some grad. school or more	47	46	8	0
Denomination				
Orthodox	63	32	4	0
Conservative	48	46	6	0
Reform	31	55	14	0
Just Jewish	29	53	18	0
Synagogue member				
Yes	50	43	6	0
No	24	57	19	0
Jewish organization member				
Yes	55	39	6	0
No	28	57	15	0
Visited Israel				
Yes	61	35	4	0
No	28	57	15	0
Closeness to Israel				
Very close	78	21	1	0
Fairly close	32	62	6	0
Fairly/very distant	7	58	35	0
Marital status (if married)				
Spouse Jewish	46	47	7	0
Spouse not Jewish	16	55	29	0

Table 13
“Have you ever been to Israel?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Yes-once	Yes-more than once	No
Total	21	12	67
Sex			
Male	23	13	65
Female	18	12	69
Age			
Under 40	19	12	69
40-59	16	11	73
60+	27	15	58
Income			
<\$30,000	21	7	72
\$30,000-49,999	17	12	71
\$50,000-74,999	20	11	68
\$75,000+	25	17	58
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	20	10	71
Some college	18	8	74
College graduate	21	16	63
Some grad. school or more	23	16	61
Denomination			
Orthodox	25	35	39
Conservative	24	14	62
Reform	18	8	75
Just Jewish	18	10	72
Synagogue member			
Yes	25	18	57
No	15	6	79
Jewish organization member			
Yes	25	21	54
No	17	7	76
Visited Israel			
Yes	62	38	0
No	0	0	100
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	27	33	40
Fairly close	21	6	72
Fairly/very distant	11	2	88
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	25	15	60
Spouse not Jewish	6	3	91

Table 14
“Do you consider yourself a Zionist?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Yes	No	Not sure
Total	29	69	3
Sex			
Male	27	70	3
Female	31	67	2
Age			
Under 40	32	63	5
40-59	28	71	1
60+	25	73	3
Income			
<\$30,000	29	68	2
\$30,000-49,999	28	70	3
\$50,000-74,999	25	72	3
\$75,000+	37	61	2
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	22	74	4
Some college	26	73	2
College graduate	32	65	4
Some grad. school or more	32	65	3
Denomination			
Orthodox	44	48	8
Conservative	36	61	3
Reform	22	76	2
Just Jewish	24	74	2
Synagogue member			
Yes	36	60	3
No	19	79	2
Jewish organization member			
Yes	40	58	2
No	22	75	3
Visited Israel			
Yes	43	54	3
No	22	76	3
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	53	45	3
Fairly close	25	72	3
Fairly/very distant	9	88	3
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	30	67	3
Spouse not Jewish	18	78	3

Table 15

“Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew.” (in percents)

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	79	19	2
Sex			
Male	77	21	2
Female	81	17	3
Age			
Under 40	77	20	3
40-59	79	19	2
60+	81	16	3
Income			
<\$30,000	80	17	2
\$30,000-49,999	78	19	3
\$50,000-74,999	81	17	2
\$75,000+	77	22	1
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	83	16	1
Some college	81	16	3
College graduate	76	21	2
Some grad. school or more	78	20	2
Denomination			
Orthodox	87	13	0
Conservative	92	7	1
Reform	78	19	3
Just Jewish	60	36	4
Synagogue member			
Yes	87	12	1
No	69	27	4
Jewish organization member			
Yes	90	9	1
No	72	25	3
Visited Israel			
Yes	87	11	2
No	75	22	3
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	97	2	1
Fairly close	86	12	2
Fairly/very distant	44	50	5
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	82	16	2
Spouse not Jewish	66	30	4

Table 16

"If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life." (in percents)

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	68	28	3
Sex			
Male	67	29	4
Female	70	28	3
Age			
Under 40	59	36	5
40-59	71	27	3
60+	78	20	3
Income			
<\$30,000	76	23	1
\$30,000-49,999	65	31	3
\$50,000-74,999	66	31	3
\$75,000+	67	30	3
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	78	18	4
Some college	67	29	3
College graduate	63	34	3
Some grad. school or more	68	29	3
Denomination			
Orthodox	85	14	1
Conservative	80	18	3
Reform	63	34	3
Just Jewish	55	40	5
Synagogue member			
Yes	78	21	2
No	57	38	5
Jewish organization member			
Yes	81	17	2
No	60	36	4
Visited Israel			
Yes	82	15	2
No	62	35	4
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	95	4	1
Fairly close	72	24	4
Fairly/very distant	31*	65	5
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	75	22	3
Spouse not Jewish	43	52	5

Table 17

"When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive." (in percents)

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	49	47	4
Sex			
Male	47	48	4
Female	51	46	3
Age			
Under 40	43	54	3
40-59	50	46	4
60+	55	39	5
Income			
<\$30,000	56	39	5
\$30,000-49,999	47	48	5
\$50,000-74,999	45	53	2
\$75,000+	48	51	1
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	51	40	8
Some college	51	48	2
College graduate	53	45	2
Some grad. school or more	44	51	5
Denomination			
Orthodox	55	34	11
Conservative	49	48	3
Reform	47	51	2
Just Jewish	52	43	5
Synagogue member			
Yes	48	48	4
No	50	46	4
Jewish organization member			
Yes	51	46	3
No	48	48	4
Visited Israel			
Yes	50	45	5
No	49	48	3
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	50	46	4
Fairly close	50	47	3
Fairly/very distant	47	48	5
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	52	44	5
Spouse not Jewish	41	56	3

Table 18
“The criticism of Israel that we hear derives mainly from anti-Semitism.” (in percents)

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	56	40	4
Sex			
Male	51	45	4
Female	61	35	4
Age			
Under 40	55	42	3
40-59	54	42	4
60+	60	34	7
Income			
<\$30,000	64	30	5
\$30,000-49,999	59	37	4
\$50,000-74,999	55	41	4
\$75,000+	46	51	3
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	65	31	4
Some college	62	33	5
College graduate	56	39	5
Some grad. school or more	46	49	4
Denomination			
Orthodox	62	32	6
Conservative	61	35	4
Reform	50	45	5
Just Jewish	55	40	5
Synagogue member			
Yes	56	40	4
No	56	39	5
Jewish organization member			
Yes	54	42	3
No	57	38	5
Visited Israel			
Yes	51	44	5
No	59	37	4
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	55	41	5
Fairly close	58	38	4
Fairly/very distant	55	42	4
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	54	41	5
Spouse not Jewish	54	42	4

Table 19
“The American news media use a double standard in judging Israel more harshly than the Arab countries.” (in percents)

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	54	42	5
Sex			
Male	53	42	4
Female	54	41	5
Age			
Under 40	49	49	2
40-59	49	45	6
60+	64	30	6
Income			
<\$30,000	62	33	5
\$30,000-49,999	54	40	6
\$50,000-74,999	51	46	3
\$75,000+	49	48	3
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	58	35	7
Some college	54	42	4
College graduate	54	44	3
Some grad. school or more	52	44	5
Denomination			
Orthodox	82	17	1
Conservative	58	38	3
Reform	49	45	6
Just Jewish	46	49	6
Synagogue member			
Yes	62	34	4
No	43	51	6
Jewish organization member			
Yes	68	29	4
No	44	50	5
Visited Israel			
Yes	74	22	4
No	44	51	5
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	77	19	4
Fairly close	49	46	5
Fairly/very distant	36	58	6
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	58	36	6
Spouse not Jewish	38	59	3

Table 20

"I am worried that the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel." (in percents)

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	23	75	2
Sex			
Male	20	78	2
Female	26	73	1
Age			
Under 40	25	74	1
40-59	21	78	1
60+	22	75	3
Income			
<\$30,000	23	75	2
\$30,000-49,999	25	74	1
\$50,000-74,999	22	77	1
\$75,000+	20	79	1
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	19	79	2
Some college	25	74	2
College graduate	26	73	1
Some grad. school or more	20	78	2
Denomination			
Orthodox	45	52	3
Conservative	25	74	1
Reform	17	81	2
Just Jewish	22	77	2
Synagogue member			
Yes	26	73	2
No	19	79	2
Jewish organization member			
Yes	27	72	1
No	20	78	2
Visited Israel			
Yes	26	72	2
No	21	77	2
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	29	69	2
Fairly close	22	77	1
Fairly/very distant	18	79	3
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	24	75	2
Spouse not Jewish	22	77	1

Table 21

“American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel.” (in percents)

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	32	65	2
Sex			
Male	29	69	2
Female	35	62	3
Age			
Under 40	24	74	1
40-59	28	69	3
60+	46	51	3
Income			
<\$30,000	43	54	3
\$30,000-49,999	34	63	2
\$50,000-74,999	30	68	2
\$75,000+	20	79	1
Education			
H.S. grad. or less	40	57	3
Some college	37	61	2
College graduate	32	68	1
Some grad. school or more	24	73	2
Denomination			
Orthodox	48	51	1
Conservative	41	56	3
Reform	26	72	2
Just Jewish	25	72	2
Synagogue member			
Yes	35	63	2
No	29	68	2
Jewish organization member			
Yes	36	61	2
No	30	68	2
Visited Israel			
Yes	36	61	3
No	30	68	2
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	40	57	3
Fairly close	28	70	2
Fairly/very distant	32	66	3
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	33	64	3
Spouse not Jewish	21	78	1

Table 22
Numbers of respondents in each subgroup.

Subgroup	<i>N</i>
Total	1,009
Sex	
Male	494
Female	515
Age	
Under 40	376
40-59	313
60+	317
Income	
<\$30,000	202
\$30,000-49,999	281
\$50,000-74,999	222
\$75,000+	216
Education	
H.S. grad. or less	167
Some college	243
College graduate	241
Some grad. school or more	293
Denomination	
Orthodox	71
Conservative	347
Reform	330
Just Jewish	244
Synagogue member	
Yes	559
No	448
Jewish organization member	
Yes	401
No	603
Visited Israel	
Yes	333
No	676
Closeness to Israel	
Very close	276
Fairly close	485
Fairly/very distant	238
Marital status (if married)	
Spouse Jewish	597
Spouse not Jewish	153

ADDENDUM

Comparison of 1993 Market Facts Telephone Sample and 1990 NJPS (Core Jews Only) and 1991 Market Facts Mail Samples.

	Samples			
	1993 Market Facts	1991 Market Facts (R. Cohen & S. Rosen)	1991 Market Facts (S. Cohen)	1990 NJPS*
Attend services weekly	14	7	NA	9
Belong to one or more Jewish organizations (other than synagogue or temple)	40	33	46	28
Belong to synagogue or temple	56	48	53	33
Light Hanukkah candles (always, usually)	82	78	NA	60
Attend Passover seder (always, usually)	80	76	NA	62
Have Christmas tree (always, usually)	14	19	NA	28
Been to Israel	33	31	37	26
Spouse Jewish	79	72	91	NA
Denomination				
Orthodox	7	10	7	6
Conservative	35	34	38	35
Reform	33	33	31	38
"Just Jewish"	24	21	23	10
Other	1	2	1	11

* 1990 NJPS figures obtained from Sidney Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey," 1992 *American Jewish Year Book*, p. 172.

QUESTIONNAIRE
(All responses in percents)

1. To begin, how closely do you follow the news about Israel?

Very closely	39
Somewhat closely	50
Not closely	12
Not sure	0

2. Have you ever been to Israel?

No	67
Yes - once	21
Yes - more than once	12

3. How close do you feel to Israel?

Very close	27
Fairly close	48
Fairly distant	20
Very distant	4
Not sure	1

4. Compared to 3 or 4 years ago, do you now feel closer to or more distant from Israel, or about the same?

Closer	17
More distant	3
About the same	79
Not sure	0

5. Do you consider yourself a Zionist?

Yes	29
No	69
Not sure	3

6. Overall, do you support or oppose the Israeli government's current handling of the peace negotiations with the Arabs?

Support	84
Oppose	9
Not sure	8

7. Was the Israeli government right or wrong in opening negotiations with the PLO in order to reach an agreement on Palestinian autonomy?

Right	87
Wrong *	8
Not sure	5

8. Israel and the PLO have agreed on a plan for Palestinian autonomy that will begin in Gaza and Jericho, and at a later stage will extend autonomy to other areas in the West Bank. From what you know so far, are you for or against this plan?

For	75
Against	13
Not sure	13

9. Are you for or against the Palestinian autonomy plan as it applies to the Gaza Strip?

For	69
Against	15
Not sure	16

10. Are you for or against the Palestinian autonomy plan as it applies to Jericho?

For	64
Against	17
Not sure	20

11. Are you for or against extending Palestinian autonomy to other areas in the West Bank at a later stage?

For	43
Against	34
Not sure	23

12. Do you feel that Jewish settlements should continue to be established in the West Bank and Gaza at this time?

Yes	43
No	47
Not sure	11

13. How much land should Israel be willing to give up on the West Bank in order to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians?

All of it	2
Most of it	10
Some of it	44
Only a small part of it	23
None of it	15
Not sure	6

14. Do you think the plan for Palestinian autonomy increases the possibility of another war, or increases the chance for peace with the Arabs?

Increases the possibility of another war	17
Increases the chance for peace with the Arabs	73
Neither increases the possibility of war nor the chance of peace	2
Not sure	9

15. Do you think there will be a war between Israel and the Arabs in the near future?

Yes	20
No	66
Not sure	14

- 15a. (ASKED OF AND BASED ON RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED "YES" TO Q.15) When do you think this war will occur?

Within weeks or months	8
Perhaps in another year or two	40
Perhaps 3-5 years from now	36
Perhaps 6-10 years from now	5
Perhaps after 10 years or more	2
Not sure	9

16. Do you think that the current plan for Palestinian autonomy is likely, or is not likely, to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank?

Likely to lead to a Palestinian state	66
Not likely to lead to a Palestinian state	20
Not sure	14

17. Given the current situation, do you favor or oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state?

Favor	57
Oppose	30
Not sure	13

18. Do you believe the autonomy agreement between Israel and the PLO will lead to a strengthening or a weakening of terrorist activities against Israel during the next year?

Strengthening	38
Weakening	49
Not sure	13

19. In the wake of the autonomy agreement with the PLO, do you expect violence in Israel between Jews with differing political views?

Yes	55
No	39
Not sure	6

20. In the wake of the autonomy agreement with the PLO, do you expect violence in the territories between Palestinians with differing political views?

Yes	81
No	14
Not sure	6

21. In the framework of a permanent peace with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction?

Yes	30
No	62
Not sure	8

22. Israel and the PLO have officially recognized each other. Do you think this is a positive or negative development from Israel's point of view?

Positive	90
Negative	7
Not sure	3

23. Can the PLO be relied upon to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorist activity against Israel?

Yes	34
No	42
Not sure	25

24. What should Israel be willing to give up on the Golan Heights in order to reach a peace agreement with Syria?

All of it	2
Most of it	5
Some of it	29
Only a small part of it	30
None of it	27
Not sure	6

25. How do you see Israel's overall situation today?

Very good	9
Good	56
Neither good nor bad	26
Bad	6
Very bad	1
Not sure	2

26. Is Israel's overall situation better now, worse now, or about the same now as it was one year ago?

Better now	66
Worse now	4
About the same	27
Not sure	2

27. The goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel.

Agree	42
Disagree	50
Not sure	9

28. When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive.

Agree	49
Disagree	47
Not sure	4

29. I am worried that the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel.

Agree	23
Disagree	75
Not sure	2

30. Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew.

Agree	79
Disagree	19
Not sure	2

31. If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life.

Agree	68
Disagree	28
Not sure	3

32. The criticism of Israel that we hear derives mainly from anti-Semitism.

Agree	56
Disagree	40
Not sure	4

33. The American news media use a double standard in judging Israel more harshly than the Arab countries.

Agree	54
Disagree	42
Not sure	5

34. Israel should reject the principle of "trading land for peace."

Agree	27
Disagree	68
Not sure	5

35. The PLO is determined to destroy Israel.

Agree	34
Disagree	57
Not sure	10

36. American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel.

Agree	32
Disagree	65
Not sure	2

37. Anti-Semitism in America is currently not a serious problem for American Jews.

Agree	17
Disagree	80
Not sure	3

38. In your view, which one of the following four reasons is the main reason that the U.S. supports Israel?

Because of shared values such as freedom and democracy	34
Because Israel is a strategic asset	44
Because of American Jewish influence	17
Because of poor relations between America and the Arabs	2
Not sure	3

39. In light of the autonomy agreement with the Palestinians and mutual Israel-PLO recognition, do you see a need for a continuing U.S. role in the Middle East peace process?

Yes	92
No	7
Not sure	1

39A. (ASKED OF AND BASED ON RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED "YES" TO Q.39:) In which of these ways?

	Yes	No	Not sure
a. Providing substantial economic aid to the region?	76	22	3
b. Combating Islamic fundamentalist forces?	63	31	6
c. Brokering a deal between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights?	72	24	5
d. Encouraging further compromise between Israel and the Palestinians?	74	23	3

40. How important would you say being Jewish is in your own life?

Very important	59
Fairly important	35
Not very important	6

41. Do you belong to a synagogue or temple?

Yes	56
No	44

42. Do you currently belong to any Jewish organizations other than a synagogue or temple?

Yes	40
No	60

43. Do you think of yourself as . . .

Orthodox	7
Conservative	35
Reconstructionist	1
Reform	33
"Just Jewish"	24

44a. Are you currently married?

Yes	75
No	25

44b. (IF YES IN 44a, ASK:) Is your spouse Jewish?

Yes - spouse Jewish	59
No - spouse not Jewish	15

45. About how often do you personally attend any type of synagogue, temple, or organized Jewish religious service?

Not at all	12
Only on special occasions (weddings, bar mitzvahs, etc.)	12
Only on High Holidays (Rosh Hashana, Yom Kippur)	8
A few times a year (3+)	22
About once a month	14
Several times a month	11
About once a week	10
Several times a week	4
Once or twice a year	8

46. Did you receive any formal Jewish education? (IF YES, ASK:) What was the major type of schooling you received?

None - no formal Jewish education	21
Full-time Jewish school, day school, or yeshiva	10
Part-time Jewish school that met more than once a week, afternoon school, Talmud Torah, or cheder	43
Sunday school or one-day- a-week Jewish educational program	23
Private tutoring	2

47. Does your household do the following things all the time, usually, sometimes, or never?

	All time	Usually	Sometimes	Never
a. Light Hanukkah candles	75	7	9	9
b. Attend a Passover seder	71	9	14	6
c. Have a Christmas tree	12	2	7	79
d. Celebrate Purim	35	7	27	31

48. What is your age as of your last birthday?

Under 30	11
30-39	26
40-49	17
50-59	14
60-69	15
70 or over	17

49. I'm going to read a series of income ranges, and please stop me when I read the one that includes your total household income in 1992 before taxes.

Under \$20,000	10
\$20,000 to under \$30,000	12
\$30,000 to under \$40,000	16
\$40,000 to under \$50,000	14
\$50,000 to under \$75,000	24
\$75,000 to under \$100,000	11
\$100,000 and over	13



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