

Jews, Blacks and Ethnics

The 1978 "Vote White" Charter Campaign in Philadelphia

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PREFACE

As an intergroup relations agency deeply concerned with the causes and amelioration of group conflict, the American Jewish Committee has, for many decades, fostered research on the nature of prejudice, and on the ways in which different religious, racial and ethnic groups perceive and interact with one another.


These studies were, for the most part, action-oriented investigations designed to provide the knowledge that would help American society extend the rights and improve the opportunities of all its citizens. In recent years, however, we have expanded our research interests to encompass not only the underlying patterns of conflict between groups, but also the broader dynamics of group life in America, with its wide variety of values, interests and life styles. Our explorations concerning the role of ethnicity in American life have helped increase understanding about the role of group identity in education, mental health, and many other facets of everyday living.

This is the second time the AJC's investigations of intergroup relationships have centered on Philadelphia. In 1972, our Philadelphia Chapter cosponsored, with our Institute of Human Relations, a study by Henry Cohen and Gary Sandrow of the Jewish and Black impact on the primary and the election in which Frank L. Rizzo became mayor of that heavily ethnic city. The study was later published under the title, Philadelphia Chooses a Mayor, 1971.

Now the Philadelphia Chapter and the Institute of Human Relations have commissioned another study, by two political scientists, Sandra Featherman and William L. Rosenberg, of ethnic voting patterns in the critical Charter change referendum in Philadelphia in November, 1978--a campaign whose harsh racial rhetoric and bitter ethnic division attracted nationwide attention. The findings in this campaign are compared with results of the 1975 election which returned Mayor Rizzo to office for a second term. This report and its predecessor thus cast light on the way group conflicts have affected three successive elections in a major American city.

We believe these findings, which speak to the depth of group feeling in our country, are important not only for the people of Philadelphia, but for the nation as a whole. For they underscore the fact that in our pluralist society, ties of color, creed and ancestry will continue to influence--and in some situations, to determine--how Americans respond to particular issues and events.

--Bertram H. Gold
Executive Vice President
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INTRODUCTION

By Murray Friedman

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The rise (or at least legitimization) of ethnicity in American life during recent years has aroused sharp debate. Advocates of the "new pluralism" emphasize the value of group identity and "roots" in a society that desperately needs stabilizing forces; critics reply that purported ethnic differences often are really class differences and warn of further social fragmentation.

The effort of Philadelphia's controversial Mayor, Frank L. Rizzo, to have the City Charter changed in order to become eligible for a third term raised many of the issues. The Charter change referendum received nationwide attention, because charges were made that in campaigning for it, Rizzo had urged audiences to "vote White."

The present study of electoral patterns in the Philadelphia referendum throws considerable light on the role of ethnicity in the politics of a large Northern city, and on a number of related questions. Featherman and Rosenberg succinctly sum up their conclusion in their opening paragraph: "Ethnic voting is alive and healthy in our cities...when electoral campaigns are perceived to involve major threats (or protection of benefits) to the groups concerned."

So strong, indeed, was the pull of ethnic ties or the threat felt by Philadelphia's various ethnic (including racial and religious) groups that class status was virtually wiped out as an important factor when the voters went to the polls on November 7, 1978. Italian Americans, according to our authors, voted so consistently for the Charter change--and, in effect, for Rizzo--that areas below the median income differed by only 7 percentage points from those above: 86 to 79 percent. Blacks voted against the Charter change by a whopping 96 percent. (In 1975, more than a third of the Black vote had gone to Rizzo, even though there was a prominent Black in the race.)

Among Polish Americans and Jews, patterns for or against the Charter change were not much less pronounced. Only Irish Americans may be said to have divided their vote along class lines, and even here the differences were not great enough to affect the outcome: Lower-income Irish voters supported the Charter change, by 70 percent, and so did higher-income Irish, albeit by only 54 percent.

The referendum also exemplified the much-discussed, growing power and sophistication of Black voters. It was the Blacks, chiefly, who blocked Rizzo's bid for a third term. (Simultaneously, according to close observers, Blacks were helping overthrow Chicago's famed Daley machine by voting against its mayoral candidate, Michael Bilandic.) That the performance of Philadelphia Blacks as a cohe-

sive, effective political force was no mere fluke became evident in the primary that followed the referendum in April 1979. According to an estimate by the Philadelphia Inquirer, 90 percent of Black voters voted for Charles Bowser, an attorney, who emphasized that if nominated and elected he would be the city's first Black mayor (June 17, 1979).

More surprising, perhaps, was the way Jews voted. During recent years, Jews have been widely viewed as increasingly conservative. In Philadelphia, in 1971, Jewish voters divided 50-50 for and against Rizzo, and four years later they gave him 53 percent. In the 1978 referendum, however, they voted "no" by 69 to 31 percent. Moreover, there was only a slight difference between the more prosperous (presumably more liberal) Jewish voters and the less prosperous ones: 30 and 36 percent "yes," respectively. It is probably no exaggeration to suggest that Black and Jewish voters, along with some upper-class White Anglo-Saxon Protestants, defeated the Charter change and frustrated Rizzo's plan.

This sharp drop in Jewish support for Rizzo--a loss of over two-fifths since 1975--was presumably due, at least in part, to the "Anglo-Saxon Protestant middle-class style of politics," which the Jews, as noted by Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson in their book, City Politics, adopted earlier than most religio-ethnic groups. Banfield and Wilson define this style as an "emphasis upon the obligation of the individual to participate in public affairs and to seek the good for the community 'as a whole,'" rather than upon seeking special, immediate gains for oneself or one's group (p. 41).


At the height of the fevered 1960s, crime and racial disorder were racking many American cities with increasing severity, or at least were arousing intensified concern. At such a time, a "law-and-order" figure like Rizzo (previously police commissioner) was attractive to Jews, particularly to lower-middle-class Jews who were in the path of the urban storm (Milton Himmelfarb, "Jewish Class Conflict?," Commentary, January 1970, pp. 37-42).

By 1978, however, Jews were ready to revert to their basic regard for the general good. They worried about Rizzo, whom they now saw as a person different from themselves, and who proposed to alter--to violate, as his opponents put it--the basic frame of government for the sake of his career. Moreover, the inflamed racial rhetoric associated with his attempt may have offended Jews, whose memories and fears of racism lie very near the surface. The experience of bigotry and violence is at least as influential as class status in determining how Jews vote.

The vote on the referendum suggests that the much-discussed "Jewish turn to the right" may have been exaggerated. A nationwide New York Times-CBS survey of 8,933 voters in November 1978 found Jews more liberal than any other group of white voters. They were more opposed to limiting abortion, more likely to favor an arms-limitation agreement with the Soviet Union, and less interested in conservative proposals for a constitutional amendment that would require

a balanced budget in order to cut welfare expenditures and other government services (The New York Times, November 12, 1978). Alan M. Fisher reports that in virtually every one of 200 survey questions asked since 1948 which he examined, Jews were more sympathetic to Blacks than any other White group. Though, like other Whites, they tended to associate Blacks with increasing urban violence and the decline of the public schools, they were much more ready to accept middle-class Blacks as neighbors and friends ("Where Is the New Jewish Conservatism?," Society, May-June 1979, p. 17).

The 1978 Charter change referendum in Philadelphia, in which Jews and Blacks found themselves allied, may thus be a small indication that recent tensions between these two groups--once major partners in the "liberal" coalition--can be overcome under certain circumstances. On the other hand, the referendum confirms that racial confrontation still poisons the atmosphere, in Philadelphia as elsewhere. Which way Americans in each city or town choose to go during the coming years will determine whether we can close ranks as a nation in a common quest for social peace and progress, or will remain divided, one against another.



JEWS, BLACKS AND ETHNICS

Ethnic voting is alive and healthy in our cities. In spite of a belief that it has diminished, ethnic and racial groups still appear to vote substantially along ethnic and racial lines when electoral campaigns are perceived to involve major threats (or protection of benefits) to the groups concerned.

While ethnic or racial groups will not necessarily vote as directed blocs, a similarity of perceived interests evidently is shared by members of a particular group. Indeed, this shared perspective is so strong that variances in voting patterns within an ethnic group, whether attributable to income or geographic differences, appeared in our study to be generally far smaller than differences among the groups when salient ethnic issues were perceived to be at stake.

On November 7, 1978, an especially important election took place in Philadelphia. Though no candidates' names were attached to the major question on the ballot, there was an implicit candidate, Frank L. Rizzo, Mayor of Philadelphia at the time.

Because the issues in this election came to be cast in racial terms, the election provided a unique opportunity to examine patterns of ethnic responses, as indicated by votes. The voting patterns of six ethnic or racial groups were analyzed: Black, Jewish, Italian, Polish, Irish and Puerto Rican. Each of these groups had a distinctive voting pattern, and in most cases there was incredible consistency in the percentages by which the members of any one group voted, regardless of where they resided and, to some extent, irrespective of income range within the group.

The referendum, which sought to repeal a limitation on the number of terms a mayor could serve, was perceived as crucial to their well-being by Black Philadelphians, who indicated the importance of the election to them by registering and turning out to vote in record numbers. Blacks voted overwhelmingly "no," while Whites, as a group, voted "yes."

While Mayor Rizzo had been categorized by many, both before and during his years in office, as anti-Black, our estimates indicate that he had received the support of more than one-third of the Black voters when he ran for his second term as mayor, in the 1975 general election.

During the 1978 campaign to eliminate the Home Rule Charter's two-term limit on holding the office of Mayor, Rizzo made a statement suggesting that Black voters were being urged by some to "vote Black." He followed this by exhorting Whites to "vote White." Although he claimed to have simply made an observation that Whites could "vote White," the utterance was widely interpreted as a direct appeal to racial prejudices.¹

As a result, there was massive Black resistance to the Charter change, which would have permitted Rizzo to run again for mayor. Only 4 percent of the Black voters supported the Charter change, and 96 percent voted against it--an incredible result, especially in Philadelphia, where the Black community had long been considered quiescent.² Indeed, the Black turnout and vote confounded all prognostications and may well have altered the shape of political coalitions and considerations in Philadelphia for the indefinite future.

The vote of the Jewish community was also expected to be critical to the outcome. As Blacks comprised only a minority, albeit a significant one, of all eligible voters, they alone could not defeat the proposed Charter amendment; white "no" votes would be necessary to do so. Attention focused on the Jewish community, which had previously had an image of traditional liberalism with its commitment to racial equality. True, in Philadelphia this commitment appeared to be waning; Jews had been prominent among Rizzo's key workers and financial contributors, Jewish voters were generally considered to be supportive of the Mayor, and our analysis indicates that in the 1975 election, in a three-way race, Rizzo got an absolute majority of the Jewish votes cast: 53 percent. On the other had, anti-Rizzo efforts over the years, such as a Rizzo Recall Drive, had been led by or disproportionately composed of Jews. In the 1978 election, Jews in every part of the city turned massively against the Rizzo Administration's position, voting 69 percent against the Charter change. By contrast, in one of the other White ethnic groups examined, only 15 percent were against the proposed change.

ETHNIC VOTING

In our unmelted melting pot, ethnic considerations still loom large, especially where elections are concerned. Ethnic groups often appear to vote as blocs for particular candidates or parties, sometimes forming relatively long-lasting voting coalitions on which politicians rely for support from election to election. Occasionally, bloc support is given by members of an ethnic group on an ad hoc basis to accomplish a particular electoral purpose at a particular time.

Such an ad hoc response may well have been present in the 1978 Charter change campaign in Philadelphia. While the Democratic Party endorsed the change and campaigned for it, the Republican Party did not oppose it, either formally or informally. Support and opposition cut across traditional party lines, and previous allegiances and alignments therefore gave voters few cues as to desirable responses. Lacking such informational aids, voters appear either to have taken cues from others with whom they shared ethnicity or to have turned inward to traditional values as guidelines. Such values are often colored by ethnic perspectives and shared most closely by those of the same ethnic background. They certainly appear to have been resorted to in this election; differences in the support for the Charter change were generally far smaller within each ethnic group examined than among different groups.

Voters in the United States are affected by a wide range of social and cultural issues which tend to shape and reshape voting attitudes. While the two-party system has attempted to establish long-standing support based upon particular ideological viewpoints, ethnics, like others, often find themselves not adequately represented by either of the major parties and thus tend to go to their own, more immediate, ethnic groups for their voting dispositions. Through bloc voting for their self-interests, ethnic groups compete on political issues in the classic Federalist sense.

Factors which have an effect on the patterns of particular voting blocs include internal social and cultural changes which affect a group's cohesion and behavior, as well as the various cues and signals from the political environment.³ Within society there are "social and psychological group ties which persist despite acculturation, the adoption of common norms, life styles, and aspirations."⁴ While these factors may not be readily apparent to outsiders, those within a particular ethnic group are generally very much aware of their presence.

Among the forces which shape the voting behavior of a group are those which move the entire electorate in a certain direction, such as a shift to the right or left, and those which produce a particular response within a particular social group, such as the traditional liberalism of Jewish voters.

Virtually all groups, whether ethnic or cultural, are subject to divisions of interest among their members. These divisions may be based on class, age, ethnicity or other differences within the group itself. When the differentiation is primarily along the lines of group identification and involvement, it may be taken as evidence that a group-salient issue is present and that ethnicity does matter.⁵

Various ethnic groups exhibit different characteristics which can be highlighted by their group voting behavior. The degree of bloc voting within any of the ethnic groups to be analyzed here depends on a number of variables, some of which we will discuss. It should be recognized that the following generalizations about ethnic groups are not applicable to all individuals within any group but rather become evident at the aggregate level.

ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE STUDY

Traditionally, Jews have been more liberal and more Democratic than any other White ethnic group. High voter registration and electoral turnout rates give them an effectiveness at the polls out of proportion to their population strength. If income and occupation were the sole determinants of political choice, Jews might be expected to behave like upper-class Protestants and vote Republican. Yet, as Ladd has shown, Jews are still grossly underrepresented in the Republican Party.⁶ According to Himmelfarb, "Jews have the wealth and status of Episcopalians and yet vote like Puerto Ricans."⁷

While the turnout rates of Jewish and Puerto Rican voters differed greatly in the 1978 election, the overall rates of support for the Charter change were reasonably similar in the two communities.

The Black turnout, unlike that of the Jews, has generally been low. Percentages of registered Black voters today tend to fall substantially below those of their White counterparts. However, northern, urban Blacks once had participation rates nearly equivalent with Whites,⁸ and both registration and turnout rates for Blacks may rise where the potential Black vote becomes large enough to make a difference and where Black interests are at stake. With their substantial numbers in urban centers, Blacks, if organized, registered and voting, can dramatically affect the outcomes of many elections.

Realizing this, Black organizations in Philadelphia made a concerted effort before the 1978 general election to register as many Blacks as possible in order to defeat the Charter referendum. They succeeded in registering over 62,000 additional Black voters; and as our study indicates, on the Charter issue, Black participation rates were reasonably close to White rates.

The Irish present a classic example of an assimilated ethnic group in the United States. Of all White ethnic groups, they have been in America the longest, with approximately three-quarters of them now third generation.⁹ In social characteristics such as income and education, the Irish voter tends to be the typical American.¹⁰ We found the Irish throughout all parts of the city to be assimilated, to have the least cohesive voting patterns, and to be--at least in the case of upper-income voters--the quintessential White voters in the Charter election.

The Poles, on the other hand, are thought to be the least assimilated of the White ethnics.¹¹ They live in homogeneous neighborhoods, often close to friends and relatives. According to observers, they are often concerned about the intrusion of outsiders into their neighborhoods.¹² Even so, Polish support for the Charter change, while high, was lower than Italian, and significantly lower than Polish support for Rizzo had been in 1975. Polish voters appear to vote their class interests, as evidenced by their general support for the Democratic party.¹³

Among White ethnics, the Italians are second only to the Poles in their percentage belonging to the working class.¹⁴ National studies have indicated that Italians have somewhat lower voting turnout figures than their population proportions warrant. In the Philadelphia Charter election, however, they had the highest turnout rates of any group examined, including upper-income liberal WASPS. The Italian vote is strongly Democratic in most areas. In some, there are well-established ties between the Italian community and the Republican party; but when Rizzo ran as a Democrat, significant numbers of Italians changed party registration in order to support him in the primary election. It has been noted that when Italians have an opportunity to vote for Italian candidates, they usually support them quite heavily.¹⁵

Puerto Ricans suffer from language difficulties, low-paying jobs, low levels of education and widespread poverty, all of which discourage their electoral participation.¹⁶ Their low turnout levels, evidenced by this study, limit their voting efficacy. With increases in income, education and job opportunities they may become better able, as a group, to flex their electoral muscle. Currently, their potential is largely untapped.

ELECTION RESULTS

Philadelphia is the fourth largest city in the United States, with an estimated population of approximately 1,800,000 in 1976.¹⁷ Blacks comprised nearly 34 percent of the population in 1970,¹⁸ and most observers believe their percentage increased further between 1970 and 1978, at least partly because Whites continued their exodus to the suburbs.

In the general election of 1977, Blacks had accounted for 32 percent or less of the registered voters in Philadelphia--less than one in three. By September 1978, a loss of 19,000 White and a gain of 27,000 Black registrants had given Blacks 35 percent of the total eligible voters (Table 1).¹⁹ From September until the registration deadline for the Charter vote, Black leaders put on an intensive drive for new registrations, as noted above. Rizzoites made similar, less successful efforts, especially in White working class communities. In all, 99,304 new voters were registered during this period, of whom 62,894 or 63 percent were Black. This brought the proportion of Blacks among registered voters to 38 percent--a 13 percent numerical increase in just one year, and a 16 percent increase in the Blacks' relative share of eligible voters.

Question 1 in the election, the Charter change referendum, read: "Shall the Mayor be permitted to serve for more than two successive terms?" A total of 710,307 votes were cast on Question 1. This represented a voting turnout of over 68 percent. The referendum was defeated by 472,493 to 237,814. Sixty-seven percent or two-thirds of those voting said "no."

Since Rizzo was in his second term of office, a "yes" vote would have been necessary to enable him to run again for Mayor in 1979. Though the ballot question ostensibly related to any future mayor, the issue for large numbers of persons was Mayor Rizzo and their positive or negative response to him.

It is, of course, impossible to be sure that all who voted "no" were opposed to the Mayor, or that all who voted "yes" were his fans. Many persons may well have voted on issues of principle regarding limitations of terms of office, rather than on personalities. It is also difficult to be certain that those who supported the Mayor, and hence the Charter change, approved the

* This table and subsequent tables and figures will be found in Appendix A.

"vote White" tone that ran through the campaign, or that those who voted "no" were doing so because they were antagonized or offended by the Mayor's remarks.

Nonetheless, we believe that many persons cast their ballots in response to the Mayor's explicit exhortation to vote on the basis of race. The campaign rhetoric on both sides, and the press interpretations, constantly posed the question in these terms.

Furthermore, it is difficult to explain the extraordinary differences in voting behavior among various ethnic groups without recourse to the "vote White" statement. It was seen as a rallying cry by many White ethnics because of what they considered a specific threat to the integrity of their communities: a court decision in the long-festering Whitman Park housing case. Whitman Park is a White working-class area, for which subsidized housing was proposed more than 20 years ago. The proposal met with massive resistance from the community, and the city withdrew its support. Black and liberal organizations thereupon went to court; the city appealed court orders to go ahead with the project, and the subsidized units still remain unbuilt. During the 1978 campaign, rumors continually surfaced that the Federal Government planned to move Blacks into subsidized housing in other White neighborhoods. Only Rizzo, it was often implied, stood between neighborhood "ethnic purity" and the courts and bureaucracies that would integrate neighborhoods.

THE BLACK VOTE

There is no easy way to measure how the subgroups of any population voted in an election, unless the results are unanimous or nearly so. The vote is secret, and we cannot be sure how anyone voted.

Moreover, votes are tallied by precincts or, as they are called in Philadelphia, divisions. A voting division may have more than 1,000 voters casting ballots, and it is nearly as hard to say which voters did what as it is to say why they did it.* If a division is 50 percent Black, for example, and votes 50 against Issue X, this does not necessarily mean that all Blacks were against X and all Whites for it.

Where Blacks were concerned, identification was easier than with other groups, since the registration reports designate Black registrants in each voting division and each ward. We tallied the results on the Charter change question in all wards 90 percent or more Black, as well as in all wards 90 percent or more White. For comparison, we followed the same method in examining the results of the 1975 general election.

* In Appendix B we discuss the problem of disaggregating total voting results and imputing particular voting behaviors to various ethnic groups in the population.

In the 1975 general election there had been three major candidates: Frank Rizzo on the Democratic slate, Thomas Foglietta on the Republican ticket, and Charles Bowser, a Black lawyer, on the independent Philadelphia Party slate. Even with a well-known Black on the ballot, Rizzo managed to get 17,506 out of 52,019 votes in the 11 wards designated as at least 90 percent Black: Wards 3, 4, 6, 11, 16, 28, 29, 32, 44, 47 and 60 (Table 2).²⁰ This meant that Rizzo got 34 percent of the Black vote, as we measured it. He even won one Black ward, the 16th, by 61 percent. Citywide, he received 57 percent of the votes.

In 1978, only 4 percent of Blacks in the same 11 wards voted to allow the Mayor more than two terms; 96 percent voted "no" (Table 3). Even when we added wards that were 80 to 90 percent Black, the result was still only 4 percent for the referendum.

Furthermore, the consistency with which Blacks voted "no" is astonishing. In every one of the 11 wards, the order of magnitude of the defeat was similar, ranging from 94 to 98 percent against the referendum.

Rizzo's loss of support in the Black community, as indicated by the Charter vote, was 30 percentage points. He lost 88 percent, or nearly 9 in every 10, of the Black voters who had supported him in 1975.

THE WHITE VOTE

Overall, the 25 wards that were 90 percent or more White voted 52 percent in favor of the Charter change--a proportion 13 times as great as the "yes" vote in the Black wards (Figure 1). However, the White community's response varied greatly among different wards, with some for and others against the proposal (Table 4). Support ranged from a low of 18 percent in the liberal, relatively affluent 8th Ward in Center City to a high of 83 percent in the heavily Italian, largely working-class 1st and 39th Wards of South Philadelphia. Majorities of voters supported the Charter change in 14 of the 25 wards and opposed it in 11.

These differences evidently were not occasioned solely by geography, as wards in close proximity did not necessarily exhibit closely related voting patterns. (Some did, especially where ethnicity and income levels were similar.) Nor did the ward totals reflect the preferences of ward leaders; in some wards, voters clearly voted against their leaders' positions. More to the point, according to political party scuttlebutt, many ward leaders had been taking positions that they thought reflected their residents' preferences. For example, even the Republican party leadership, with much to gain from a defeat of Question 1, refused to take a position, for fear of alienating potential support for Republican candidates on the ballot. The leadership made an assumption, evidently not entirely accurate, that many supporters of Republican

candidates would also be supporters of Rizzo, and hence of Question 1.²¹

We believe that, to a large extent, ethnicity explains the differences in the support which Question 1 received in different White areas. To test the patterns of ethnic responses, we examined the votes of major White ethnic groups: Jewish, Irish, Polish and Italian. We also looked at the way Puerto Ricans voted on the issue.

To analyze ethnic voting patterns, we isolated voting divisions where one or another of those groups accounted for more than 50 percent of the registered voters. (In some divisions, more than 90 percent of the voters belonged to one group.) We located these in all parts of the city where Census data or other information led us to believe that the particular ethnic group was disproportionately represented.

Ethnic codings were made by the methods detailed in Appendix B, and divisions were separated into those with median 1970 household incomes below or above the 1970 median for the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) as a whole, \$8,790. In one case (Poles), all of the divisions fell below the median, and in another case (Jews) all fell above it. In these two instances, we try to suggest what may have been the voting tendencies of members of the missing income categories.

THE POLISH VOTE

Though Polish voters are spread throughout the city, they are most heavily concentrated in the Port Richmond area, primarily in working class communities. Pockets of Polish registrants were located elsewhere, particularly in Roxborough, but in those areas Poles were not a majority within any division.

We tallied Polish votes in 12 divisions, representing three wards and five different Census tracts. The median incomes in these tracts ranged from \$7,038 to \$8,381, all below the metropolitan median. Because of our concern that income level effects be considered, we examined, for comparison, one upper-income division in Roxborough, the 3rd Division of the 21st Ward. Here the median income level of the Census tract in which the division was embedded was \$9,157. The 3rd Division was at least 43 percent Polish, perhaps more, and the Poles were the predominant ethnic group.

Support in the Polish community for Question 1 was strong: 62 percent overall. The vote in favor varied from 50 percent to 73 percent; we found no Polish division where a majority opposed the Charter change (Table 5). The division where the change fared worst was one of the poorest. In the one upper-income division that was substantially Polish, the vote was 176 "yes" to 110 "no," 62 percent in favor--the same percentage as in the Polish divisions as a whole.

Even though Mayor Rizzo's position on the Charter change did well in the Polish divisions, it found far less favor there than Rizzo had done in the 1975 general election, when he had polled 80

percent of the vote (Table 6). The erosion of his support in the Polish community was 18 percentage points, a loss of 23 percent or nearly one-fourth of his strength in these areas.

THE ITALIAN VOTE

We expected that the strongest ethnic support for Question 1 would come from Italians. First, the Mayor shared ethnicity with them. And second, at least one of the issues on which he campaigned was particularly salient for the Italians: the Whitman Park issue. Whitman Park is situated in South Philadelphia, which is the center of Italian life in the city.

We examined returns for 89 predominantly Italian divisions in South Philadelphia, Southwest Philadelphia and Overbrook. Of these, 79 divisions lay within 13 Census tracts with median incomes below the metropolitan area median; 10 divisions were in five tracts above the median income level. The area medians ranged from a low of \$5,351 to a high of \$11,467. Divisions in tracts below the median were tallied separately from those above, to compare results.

In the lower-income Italian divisions, 86 percent of all votes were in favor of Question 1 (Table 7). The internal consistency among divisions was astonishing; every single division supported the Charter change overwhelmingly. The lowest level of support was 67 percent, the highest 92 percent.

In upper-income Italian divisions, Question 1 did nearly as well (Table 8). Support was 79 percent overall, varying from a low of 71 percent to a high of 85 percent.

In all, Rizzo's desire to see the two-term limit on the Mayoralty removed appears to have been supported by about 85 percent of the Italian voters. Question 1 received 34,556 "yes" votes out of 40,663 cast on the issue in the 89 predominantly Italian divisions (Table 9).

The "Vote White" theme which undergirded the Charter campaign did not diminish the Mayor's support in the Italian community. He had polled 83 percent of the vote in the 89 Italian divisions in 1975 (Table 10), so that the 1978 result constituted a 2 percent increase. Italians were, as was expected, by far the strongest supporters of the Charter change that would have enabled the Mayor to serve more than two terms. No Italian division gave Question 1 less than two-thirds of its votes, and most gave far more.

THE IRISH VOTE

Of the groups we examined, the Irish were the most difficult to isolate and identify. They seem to be well represented in the four quadrants of the city. Large numbers live in pockets in South

and Southeast Philadelphia, in areas often considered by outsiders to be almost exclusively Italian. Southwest and Northeast Philadelphia both have substantial Irish populations. So does the Northwest, but in areas like Roxborough the Irish are so thoroughly commingled with other groups that they did not appear to represent more than 50 percent of any electoral division.

Because of the enormous difficulties in identification (as indicated in Appendix B), we believe we seriously undercounted Irish voters, thereby limiting to 30 the number of Irish divisions included in the study. Still, we did locate Irish divisions in 10 separate areas of the city, widely disparate in income and other respects, and thus have confidence in the validity of the findings.

The 30 divisions in which Irish voting patterns were examined represented 16 census tracts: 14 divisions in nine tracts below the SMSA median income, and 16 in seven tracts above the median. The median incomes within these tracts in 1970 ranged from \$6,056 to \$13,929. The latter figure comes from an upper-income tract with a median income which at the time stood 60 percent above the metropolitan median.

In the lower-income Irish divisions, 3,928 out of 5,589, or 70 percent of those who voted, were in favor of Question 1 (Table 11). However, unlike the other groups examined so far, the Irish differed in voting behavior across geographic areas. Support for Question 1 varied from under 49 percent to over 85 percent. Moreover, the five divisions that favored the Charter change by 75 percent or more were all in South Philadelphia, in the 1st and 36th Wards. If we were to remove these five divisions, which together voted 79 percent "yes," lower-income Irish support for the issue would drop from 70 to 63 percent.

In upper-income Irish divisions, the spread in results is still wide; but support of Question 1 begins somewhat lower than in lower-income divisions, at 47 percent, and rises less, to only 74 percent (Table 12). The overall percentage of support, 54 percent, is significantly lower than in the lower-income Irish divisions.

The Irish community as a whole appeared to support Rizzo's quest for removal of the limit on the number of terms a mayor could serve. Of 12,856 votes cast in predominantly Irish divisions, 61 percent, or 7,873, were "yes" (Table 13).

Though the overall percentages of support for Question 1 in Irish and Polish divisions are similar, our analysis has indicated quite different patterns of voting in these two communities. The Polish divisions varied far less than did the Irish. Whereas no Polish division we examined defeated Question 1, nine out of 30 Irish divisions, nearly one-third, defeated it. However, these defeats were very narrow; no Irish division turned down the Charter change by proportions even close to the city-wide ratio of 67 percent, or 2 to 1.

In the 1975 general election, Mayor Rizzo received 74 percent of the Irish vote, as we estimate it (Table 14). Thus, his support in the Irish community dropped 13 percentage points between his 1975 election and his 1978 bid for an opportunity to run again. The defection of Irish voters since 1975 amounted to 18 percent, a loss of nearly 9 out of every 50 previous Irish supporters.

THE JEWISH VOTE

A substantial appeal based on ethnic considerations was directed at the Jewish community by forces favoring the Charter change. "It's Nice To Have a Friend At The Top," read the headlines of an ad in the Jewish press. The ad, which showed Mayor Rizzo with Golda Meir, further stated: "Frank Rizzo Has Been Our Friend."²²

At the same time, a smaller ad, signed by 12 local rabbis, urged Jews to "Vote No" and listed eight Jewish organizations as opposed to the Charter change.²³ "Our people have suffered the excess of power through the ages as well as within our memories," the text began. "We have been the objects of bigotry." Certainly, the quest for the Jewish vote, from both sides, emphasized ethnic concerns.

Though Jewish voters live in many areas in Philadelphia, the voting divisions we examined are in only three, broadly defined as Center City, Wynnefield-Overbrook, and the Northeast. Many Jews live in the Northwestern part of the city, but racial integration there made it difficult to find predominantly Jewish divisions.

We examined 60 predominantly Jewish voting divisions in 20 census tracts. In 14 of these tracts, containing 51 of the 60 divisions, the median income was above the metropolitan median. The other nine divisions were upper-income enclaves within lower-income census tracts. Each of these nine divisions was located in Center City and consisted totally or substantially of voters from a high-income, high-rise apartment building. Areas designated as low-income were not used in the study unless a high-income building housed almost all of the division's registered voters.

Since all 60 divisions examined were upper-income divisions, a special effort was made to assess what the effects of income on voting may have been and to speculate on how lower-income Jewish voters may have responded to the Charter issues.

Jewish voters were substantially opposed to the Charter change (Table 15). Only 31 percent in the divisions examined voted "yes," 69 percent voted "no." None of the 60 divisions carried the Charter change. The "yes" percentages varied from 16 percent to 48 percent.

Because of our interest in the effects of income, we did some further analysis of the Jewish vote. Our findings indicate some such effects; divisions with relatively lower incomes proved to be more supportive of the Charter change. However, it must be noted that only one single Jewish division in the study voted "yes" by

as much as 48 percent. Of the rest, none supported Question 1 by more than 42 percent--a level below the lowest support given by any upper-income Irish division (47 percent, Table 12), and well below the lowest support given by any Italian division (the lowest level of support in Italian upper or lower income divisions being 67 percent, Table 7).

We looked at the effects of income on Jewish voters in several ways. First, we noted a Jewish division, the 22nd Division of the 56th Ward, comprised substantially of residents of Federation House, a Jewish home for the elderly. This was the only predominantly Jewish division we found supporting Question 1, by 175 to 146, or 55 percent. (It was not included in our totals, for two reasons: Other residents, whose income levels we did not know, also lived in it; and we might have confused the effects of age with those of income.)

We also tried to examine known areas of lower-income Jewish population. This proved difficult. There may be many low-income Jews in Philadelphia, but they reside in areas in which they no longer represent a majority of the population. In South Philadelphia, for example, there still are several pockets of lower-income Jewish households. We located four divisions in South Philadelphia's 39th Ward in which we estimated 21 to 28 percent of registered voters to be Jewish, and analyzed their election results (Table 16).

To estimate how the Jewish voters in these four divisions may have responded to Question 1, we tried to compare the overall level of support in the divisions with support levels in lower-income Italian divisions in the same ward, as well as with support levels in the Jewish community.

Our study included 25 predominantly Italian divisions below the median income in the 39th Ward. The range of support for Question 1 in these divisions was quite narrow, with a low of 83 percent and a high of 92 percent (see Table 7). A total of 9,734 voters out of 11,084 voted "yes"--a support level of 85 percent. On the other hand, city-wide Jewish support was only 31 percent (see Table 15).

Assuming that Jews and Italians in the four divisions had similar turnout levels, it is possible to estimate whether the Jewish voters in these lower-income divisions voted like their lower-income Italian neighbors or like their upper-income co-religionists.

The assumption of equal turnouts is admittedly problematic, since, as will be shown later, Italians had a slightly higher city-wide turnout level than Jews, and since other unknown factors may also have affected turnout rates.

By acting on the assumption nonetheless, the number of Jewish voters in the four divisions can be estimated at 366. Multiplying this number by the Jewish support level of 31 percent yields an estimated 113 Jewish "yes" votes. Likewise, the number of Italian voters can be estimated at 1,188, which, with a support level of 86 percent, corresponds to 1,022 "yes" votes. This would yield a combined "yes" vote of 1,135 out of 1,554 votes cast, or 73 percent.

In actual fact, the level of support was 10 points higher, 83 percent (Table 16), and only 5 points lower than the level of support in all other lower-income Italian divisions in the ward. Either Italians in the four divisions turned out or voted in higher rates than the Italian averages, or Jews in these lower-income divisions supported Question 1 more than Jews in higher-income divisions.

In a third effort to analyze the effects of income on Jewish voters, the 10 Jewish divisions in the lowest sixth of the economic range of those listed in Table 15 were compared with the 10 in the highest sixth.²⁴

As can readily be seen, income has some effect on the level of support Jewish voters gave the Charter change issue (Table 17). However, it must be noted again that, with a single exception, Jewish divisions (all of which are above the area median income level) gave Question 1 far less support than did upper-income divisions of other White ethnic groups studied.

In the 1975 general election, Mayor Rizzo received 53 percent of the Jewish vote--an absolute majority of all Jewish votes cast in a three-way contest (Table 18). Just three years later, in an election in which he was, in many respects, the candidate, the issue for which he sought support was overwhelmingly defeated by the Jewish community. Support for Rizzo among Jews apparently dropped 22 points, a loss of 42 percent, or more than two out of every five previous voters.

THE PUERTO RICAN VOTE

Though Puerto Ricans are thought to have substantial numbers in Philadelphia, they evidently are not heavily registered to vote. We found divisions with Puerto Rican majorities in two areas of the city: Spring Garden and Lower North Philadelphia. Six divisions, representing three wards and four census tracts, were examined.

Question 1 did poorly in the Puerto Rican divisions examined (Table 19). Though the levels of support varied considerably, all six divisions opposed the Charter change, and the Puerto Rican voters as a whole gave it only 23 percent of their votes.

In the 1975 general election, the Puerto Rican community had given Mayor Rizzo 78 percent of its votes (Table 20). The 23 percent support for enabling Rizzo to run again thus represented a drop of 55 percentage points and a loss of 71 percent of his previous supporters in the Puerto Rican community. Puerto Rican support for Rizzo, previously so high, had fallen off precipitously.

THE UPPER INCOME WASP VOTE

Because several substantially WASP, upper-income areas of the city had voting patterns quite different from the White vote as a

whole, a look at these areas is included to round out the study.

Identifying White Anglo-Saxon Protestants by voting or census data is almost impossible. Religion is not identified in census data, voting registration records or street lists. If a name is not clearly ethnic, it cannot be coded with assurance. However, two areas of the city are generally thought to have substantial upper-income WASP representation: Society Hill and Chestnut Hill, the 5th and 9th Wards respectively. Both have many residents of substantial wealth. One census tract in Chestnut Hill had a 1970 median household income of more than 2 1/2 times the metropolitan median.

For identifying upper-income WASP divisions in these two wards, we relied on the advice of political leaders and activists in the areas, local political reporters and reputable political analysts. We examined voting results in 15 divisions of the 5th Ward and 10 divisions of the 9th Ward.

The upper-income WASP voters in the 5th and 9th Wards overwhelmingly defeated Question 1, giving it only 15 percent of their votes (Table 21). This level of support was hardly half as high as the level given by Jewish voters, and even well below the support level of Puerto Rican voters. Only Blacks apparently voted more heavily against the Charter change.

It is essential to note that the results in these two socially desirable parts of the city may not prove anything at all about the WASP vote, even the upper-income WASP vote, in other parts of the city. The divisions included in Table 21 are known for the generally liberal voting stance of the residents, who are often termed "limousine liberals" by local politicians. Both the 5th and the 9th Ward divisions contain many Jews and Catholics, and members of all three groups living in these divisions are thought by local analysts to have somewhat similar voting patterns. The divisions are, however, as best we can ascertain, predominantly WASP.

Support for Rizzo had been low in the 5th and 9th Wards even in 1975 (Table 22). His support level then was only 28 percent. The 1978 showing of 15 percent, a drop of 13 percentage points, represents a defection of 46 percent or nearly half the former Rizzo voters in those 25 divisions.

TURNOUT RATES

The turnout rate of an ethnic group may be as influential as the direction of its vote in determining an election outcome. If the turnout by members of the group is low, the value of the group's support is reduced.

In what follows, the term "turnout rate" refers, not to the percentage of voters among members of a given group, but to the percentage of registered voters belonging to a group who voted

on Question 1. The numbers listed under "Votes on Question 1" refer to votes in the areas previously examined. For example, the number of Blacks listed as voting on Question 1 is the total number of persons recorded as voting on the issue in the 11 Black wards studied (Table 3). "Eligible voters" are the total voters registered in a given division or ward.

The overall voting turnout was 68 percent (Table 23). Blacks turned out in numbers somewhat below the average, 63 percent; Puerto Ricans were far below it, with only 32 percent; and Italians were well above with 75 percent. The average White turnout was 70 percent.

Which White groups voted below the average? This is a question we can answer only for the selected groups in the more or less homogeneous areas studied, and the findings there may or may not be typical for the city as a whole. It may be that members of a group turn out at different rates depending on whether they live in a homogeneous neighborhood or in one where they are in the minority. Also, of course, turnout rates in unexamined homogeneous areas may differ from those in areas examined. And finally, the many White voters who belong to ethnic groups not studied or who are ethnically unidentifiable may have differed in their turnout rates from those belonging to groups which were studied.

By the same token, the Black turnout may have been higher than our figures indicate. Much Black political activism has centered in the mixed wards where the more affluent Blacks live. Furthermore, many studies have shown correlations between income levels and voting turnout rates.²⁵ To check this, we looked at the turnout rates in wards that were 80 to 90 percent Black. There were 10 such wards, and their combined turnout rate was 67 percent--4 points higher than that of the 11 homogeneous Black wards studied. All 21 wards together had a turnout rate of 66 percent.

SUPPORT LEVELS

The varied levels of support which Question 1 received from the different ethnic communities examined are contrasted graphically in Figure 2.

As interesting in some ways as the overall support levels are the ranges of support within groups, i.e., the percentage differences between divisions with the lowest and the highest support levels (Figure 3). In some cases, groups do not even overlap. For example, the greatest support Question 1 received in any of the Puerto Rican divisions examined was less than the least support it received in any of the Irish, Polish or Italian divisions. This kind of stratification reinforces an observation made earlier: that within each of these ethnic groups there evidently was a fairly common perception of the issues at stake--a perception not fully shared by members, in aggregates, of any other of the ethnic groups examined.

DEFECTION RATE COMPARISONS

What we call defection rates (Table 24) are comparisons of votes in favor of the Charter change question in 1978 with votes for Rizzo in the 1975 general election, expressed as percentages of the 1975 figures. The comparison between the two sets of data is not wholly conclusive, because not everyone who voted against Question 1 may have been opposed to Mayor Rizzo or his campaign tactics. Furthermore, officeholders usually find it difficult to garner as much support for issues they prefer as for themselves. Still, Question 1 appears to have been a reasonable stand-in for support of Rizzo, inasmuch as a "yes" vote was necessary if Rizzo was to be able to continue in office.

It is tempting to suggest that defection rates may represent the extent to which previous Rizzo supporters felt offended by the tone of the campaign on behalf of Question 1. While it is hard to validate this, it may explain the Black defection rate of 88 percent and the Puerto Rican rate of 71 percent. In fact, support of the Mayor declined in all groups examined other than the Italian.

However, it is important to note that one cannot with certainty impute meanings into these aggregate returns beyond what the numbers say. The percentages of defection or support are simply a record of what occurred in a large number of voting districts representing particular ethnic groups, aggregated to allow a glimpse into how votes were cast within selected districts of ethnic constituencies.

FOOTNOTES


1. Philadelphia Inquirer, September 22, 1978, pp. 1, 6. The actual statement made by Rizzo was that "Whites are going to vote for Rizzo." He then added, amidst heavy applause that almost drowned him out, that Blacks who thought as he did would also vote for him.
2. J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Community Participation and the War on Poverty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 28.
3. William Schneider, Michael D. Berman and Mark Schultz, "Bloc Voting Reconsidered: 'Is There a Jewish Vote?'" Ethnicity, I (1974), p. 349, Academic Press.
4. Ibid., p. 349.
5. Ibid., p. 360.
6. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., Where Have All The Voters Gone? The Fracturing of America's Political Parties (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978), p. 9.
7. Milton Himmelfarb, "The Jewish Vote (Again)," Commentary, 55:81-85 (June 1973), American Jewish Committee.
8. Mark R. Levy and Michael S. Kramer, The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), p. 61.
9. Ibid., p. 123
10. Ibid., p. 124.
11. Ibid., p. 142.
12. Ibid., p. 142.
13. Ibid., p. 143.
14. Ibid., p. 166.
15. Ibid., p. 20.
16. Ibid., p. 77.
17. "Cities with 100,000 Inhabitants or More in 1970," Table No. 24, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1978 (Washington: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1978), p. 25.
18. Ibid., p. 25.

19. The registration figures for 1977 are from the Annual Report 1977. Figures for 1978 were made available to the authors by Joseph Migatz, Registration Commissioner.
20. Based on raw data for 1978 Fall voting returns and on the Annual Report of the Registration Commission, 1975.
21. Richard L. Thornburgh, who ran for Governor on the Republican slate and won, received very strong support in the areas that defeated Question 1. All of the wards that supported Question 1 supported the Democratic candidate, Peter Flaherty.
22. Jewish Times of the Greater Northeast, Philadelphia, November 2, 1978, p. 13.
23. Ibid., p. 9.
24. The lowest ten were Divisions 4, 6 and 9 in the 53rd Ward, Divisions 3, 4, 6 and 24 in the 54th Ward, and Divisions 5, 29 and 38 in the 56th Ward. The highest ten were Divisions 13, 14 and 19 in the 53rd Ward, and Divisions 7, 15, 18, 21, 22, 23 and 24 in the 63rd Ward.
25. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 189.

APPENDIXES

A. TABLES AND FIGURES

B. RESEARCH METHODS



APPENDIX A
TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLE 1
REGISTRATION, 1977 AND 1978

Date	White registrants	Black registrants	Total	Black percentage of total
November 1977	632,746	301,467	934,213	32
September 1978	613,963	328,567	942,530	35
November 1978	650,373	391,461	1,041,834	38

TABLE 2
1975 GENERAL ELECTION: RIZZO VOTE IN PREDOMINANTLY BLACK WARDS

Ward	Rizzo	Total	Percent for Rizzo
3	1,574	6,489	29
4	1,787	6,413	28
6	1,182	3,911	30
11	1,272	3,982	32
16	1,582	2,597	61
28	1,364	3,845	35
29	1,765	4,318	41
32	1,920	5,929	32
44	1,721	4,657	37
47	1,519	3,265	47
60	1,820	6,613	28
Total	17,506	52,019	34

TABLE 3

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1: VOTE IN PREDOMINANTLY BLACK WARDS

Ward	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
3	411	10,456	10,867	4
4	248	9,904	10,152	2
6	186	7,251	7,437	3
11	245	7,148	7,393	3
16	189	7,025	7,214	3
28	221	7,407	7,628	3
29	232	6,176	6,408	4
32	472	11,045	11,517	4
44	433	6,786	7,219	6
47	128	3,660	3,788	3
60	383	9,263	9,646	4
Total	3,148	86,121	89,269	4

TABLE 4

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1: VOTE IN PREDOMINANTLY WHITE WARDS

Ward	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
1	8,165	1,716	9,881	83
7	4,589	2,880	7,469	61
8	2,361	11,017	13,378	18
21	9,976	11,246	21,222	47
25	5,743	2,852	8,595	67
26	8,742	2,312	11,054	79
31	4,318	2,262	6,580	66
33	6,097	4,031	10,128	60
35	7,127	7,332	14,459	49
39	18,476	3,792	22,268	83
41	5,220	4,273	9,493	55
42	6,068	4,704	10,772	56
45	6,099	4,291	10,390	59
53	4,586	7,615	12,201	38
54	4,509	7,042	11,551	39
55	7,336	6,888	14,224	52
56	7,078	10,748	17,826	40
57	6,421	7,168	13,589	47
58	8,025	12,578	20,603	39
61	5,705	7,469	13,174	43
62	6,447	6,179	12,626	51
63	4,497	7,717	12,214	37
64	4,378	4,430	8,808	50
65	5,585	4,635	10,220	55
66	11,498	9,515	21,013	55
Total	169,046	154,692	323,738	52

TABLE 5

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1: VOTE IN PREDOMINANTLY POLISH DIVISIONS

Ward	Division	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
23	14	211	164	375	56
25	1	198	101	299	66
25	2	196	109	305	64
25	4	232	108	340	68
25	5	260	113	373	70
45	4	189	148	337	56
45	15	373	171	544	69
45	20	255	204	459	56
45	22	364	138	502	73
45	24	344	192	536	64
45	25	222	218	440	50
45	27	180	180	360	50
Total		3,024	1,846	4,870	62

TABLE 6

1975 GENERAL ELECTION: RIZZO VOTE IN POLISH DIVISIONS

Ward	Division	Rizzo	Total
23	14	318	417
25	1	222	294
25	2	252	301
25	4	288	356
25	5	274	350
45	4	259	356
45	15	450	576
45	20	366	486
45	22	435	485
45	24	426	515
45	25	326	424
45	27	298	395
Total		3,914	4,955

Support for Rizzo: 80 percent.

TABLE 7

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1:
VOTE IN PREDOMINANTLY ITALIAN DIVISIONS BELOW THE MEDIAN INCOME

Ward	Division	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
1	1	417	48	465	90
1	2	524	69	593	88
1	3	463	79	542	85
1	4	439	96	535	82
1	5	376	57	433	87
1	8	446	61	507	88
1	9	500	69	569	88
1	10	609	89	698	87
1	11	521	72	593	88
1	12	295	53	348	85
1	13	223	84	307	73
1	16	377	61	438	86
26	1	538	57	595	90
26	2	728	106	834	87
26	3	289	50	339	85
26	5	417	89	506	82
26	6	649	129	778	87
26	8	574	69	643	89
26	9	364	76	440	83
26	10	309	67	376	82
26	11	399	65	464	86
26	12	408	82	490	83
26	16	295	49	344	86
26	17	322	58	380	85
26	19	395	70	465	85
26	21	321	69	390	82
26	22	390	84	474	82
34	16	296	80	376	79
34	17	264	52	316	84
34	18	421	73	494	85
34	19	408	153	561	73
34	20	428	102	530	81
34	28	429	84	513	84
34	33	213	105	318	67
34	43	229	64	293	78
36	29	407	50	457	89
36	31	318	77	395	81
39	1	362	49	411	88
39	2	391	40	431	91
39	11	778	105	883	88
39	12	365	59	424	86
39	13	476	85	561	85
39	14	313	31	344	91
39	15	256	34	290	88
39	16	377	46	423	89
39	17	250	23	273	92
39	23	375	35	410	91
39	24	384	50	434	88

(continued)

(TABLE 7 continued)

Ward	Division	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
39	25	208	40	248	84
39	28	269	44	313	86
39	30	311	49	360	86
39	31	526	80	606	87
39	33	558	60	618	90
39	36	548	78	626	88
39	39	461	46	507	91
39	40	348	66	414	84
39	41	402	64	466	86
39	43	412	52	464	89
39	46	430	42	472	91
39	47	293	51	344	85
39	48	258	43	301	86
39	49	383	78	461	83
40	51	218	58	276	79
48	1	447	85	532	84
48	5	379	33	412	92
48	6	283	49	332	85
48	7	489	74	563	87
48	8	394	64	458	86
48	10	312	63	375	83
48	11	308	53	361	85
48	12	318	56	374	85
48	13	183	22	205	89
48	14	281	48	329	85
48	15	383	37	420	91
48	17	515	110	625	82
48	18	314	53	367	86
48	19	466	64	530	88
48	20	419	57	476	88
48	22	502	74	576	87
Total		30,946	5,148	36,094	86

TABLE 8

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1:
VOTE IN PREDOMINANTLY ITALIAN DIVISIONS ABOVE THE MEDIAN INCOME

Ward	Division	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
26	13	355	65	420	85
26	14	554	111	665	83
26	15	344	78	422	82
26	18	396	86	482	82
34	21	429	126	555	77
34	22	278	112	390	71
39	37	302	56	358	84
40	48	369	144	513	72
40	49	285	115	400	71
40	53	298	66	364	82
Total		3,610	959	4,569	79

TABLE 9

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1: VOTE IN ITALIAN DIVISIONS

Income Level	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
Divisions below median income	30,946	5,148	36,094	86
Divisions above median income	3,610	959	4,569	79
Total	34,556	6,107	40,663	85

TABLE 10

1975 GENERAL ELECTION: RIZZO VOTE IN ITALIAN DIVISIONS

Ward	Division	Rizzo	Total
1	1	398	451
1	2	470	577
1	3	411	582
1	4	498	585
1	5	368	409
1	8	460	534
1	9	545	618
1	10	667	780
1	11	559	621
1	12	304	432
1	13	407	442
1	16	419	469
26	1	531	619
26	2	617	826
26	3	278	342
26	5	364	466
26	6	614	748
26	8	479	628
26	9	307	423
26	10	253	326
26	11	376	438
26	12	387	486
26	13	343	406
26	14	600	703
26	15	290	379
26	16	342	377
26	17	313	380
26	18	387	512
26	19	385	506
26	21	308	382
26	22	417	497
34	16	325	373
34	17	295	326
34	18	356	421
34	19	422	536
34	20	439	524
34	21	472	546
34	22	325	399
34	28	430	516
34	33	253	324
34	43	230	268
36	29	483	529
36	31	361	399
39	1	363	420
39	2	383	445
39	11	623	723
39	12	342	406

(continued)

(TABLE 10 continued)

Ward	Division	Rizzo	Total
39	13	477	585
39	14	306	347
39	15	189	321
39	16	406	458
39	17	242	282
39	23	336	407
39	24	397	443
39	25	188	238
39	28	248	306
39	30	299	346
39	31	436	509
39	33	513	565
39	36	498	608
39	37	238	323
39	39	330	549
39	40	277	394
39	41	325	410
39	43	368	435
39	46	402	442
39	47	310	356
39	48	255	291
39	49	367	439
40	48	363	469
40	49	223	268
40	51	272	297
40	53	296	338
48	1	448	558
48	5	365	407
48	6	334	369
48	7	501	577
48	8	490	533
48	10	342	406
48	11	268	332
48	12	315	406
48	13	132	170
48	14	282	352
48	15	288	375
48	17	538	629
48	18	333	376
48	19	404	451
48	20	400	441
48	22	465	556
Total		33,695	40,463

Support for Rizzo: 83 percent

TABLE 11
1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1:
VOTE IN PREDOMINANTLY IRISH DIVISIONS BELOW THE MEDIAN INCOME

Ward	Division	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
1	22	279	49	328	85
15	21	195	167	362	54
15	22	196	103	299	66
25	23	229	117	346	66
35	28	158	130	288	55
36	24	386	129	515	75
36	25	617	117	734	84
36	27	631	116	747	84
36	28	378	80	458	83
40	9	186	129	315	59
40	20	194	83	277	70
45	9	148	155	303	49
45	12	174	123	297	59
49	9	157	163	320	49
Total		3,928	1,661	5,589	70

TABLE 12

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1:
VOTE IN PREDOMINANTLY IRISH DIVISIONS ABOVE THE MEDIAN INCOME

Ward	Division	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
35	9	259	266	525	49
35	10	220	247	467	47
35	11	214	232	446	48
35	12	230	207	437	53
35	15	245	255	500	49
35	17	227	241	468	49
35	22	313	269	582	54
35	23	307	211	518	59
35	24	251	206	457	55
40	22	251	141	392	64
40	23	209	83	292	72
40	24	223	116	339	66
40	41	285	99	384	74
55	9	199	188	387	51
55	24	240	265	505	48
63	17	272	296	568	48
Total		3,945	3,322	7,267	54

TABLE 13

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1: VOTE IN IRISH DIVISIONS

Income Level	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
Divisions below median income	3,928	1,661	5,589	70
Divisions above median income	3,945	3,322	7,267	54
Total	7,873	4,983	12,856	61

TABLE 14
1975 GENERAL ELECTION: RIZZO VOTE IN IRISH DIVISIONS

Ward	Division	Rizzo	Total
1	22	275	325
15	21	209	334
15	22	181	300
25	23	273	365
35	9	307	499
35	10	258	418
35	11	282	430
35	12	271	403
35	15	281	487
35	17	302	460
35	22	413	557
35	23	356	492
35	24	281	418
35	28	217	296
36	24	472	545
36	25	531	630
36	27	581	661
36	28	450	507
40	9	267	324
40	20	205	246
40	22	307	376
40	23	229	274
40	24	236	311
40	41	277	312
45	9	216	301
45	12	253	306
49	9	236	330
55	9	283	381
55	24	275	452
63	17	287	455
Total		9,011	12,195

Support for Rizzo: 74 percent

TABLE 15

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1: VOTE IN PREDOMINANTLY JEWISH DIVISIONS

Ward	Division	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
8	11	91	317	408	22
8	16	134	560	694	19
8	17	103	360	463	22
8	18	79	395	474	17
8	22	66	352	418	16
8	23	81	230	311	26
8	29	164	529	693	24
15	4	105	312	417	25
15	6	146	526	672	22
34	26	163	255	418	39
34	29	168	455	623	27
34	30	217	329	546	40
34	31	124	209	333	37
34	32	140	264	404	35
34	37	112	153	265	42
34	39	114	234	348	33
34	41	138	255	393	35
52	2	91	351	442	21
52	3	75	322	397	19
52	4	108	204	312	35
52	5	135	395	530	25
52	6	57	190	247	23
52	7	154	392	546	28
52	8	82	201	283	29
52	10	173	251	424	41
53	4	174	373	547	32
53	5	199	425	624	32
53	6	221	374	595	37
53	7	198	360	558	35
53	9	141	299	440	32
53	11	150	225	375	40
53	13	236	425	661	36
53	14	161	324	485	33
53	19	264	480	744	35
53	23	175	325	500	35
54	3	164	270	434	38
54	4	211	226	437	48
54	6	233	342	575	41
54	11	142	275	417	34
54	12	234	473	707	33
54	18	127	211	338	38
54	24	118	217	335	35
56	1	221	334	555	40
56	5	101	253	354	29
56	21	131	298	429	31

(continued)

(TABLE 15 continued)

Ward	Division	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
56	24	185	448	633	29
56	25	233	375	608	38
56	26	197	376	573	34
56	27	117	284	401	29
56	28	121	294	415	29
56	29	218	428	646	34
56	34	182	310	492	37
56	38	145	275	420	35
63	7	228	511	739	31
63	15	166	332	498	33
63	18	121	334	455	27
63	21	111	337	448	25
63	22	177	483	660	27
63	23	183	406	589	31
63	24	88	323	411	21
Total		9,093	20,062	29,155	31

TABLE 16

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1: VOTE IN FOUR DIVISIONS IN THE 39TH WARD

Division	Percent Jewish	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
32	22	401	68	469	86
34	23	251	59	310	83
42	21	301	60	361	81
45	28	341	73	414	82
Total		1,294	260	1,554	83

TABLE 17

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1: COMPARISON OF 10 LOWEST-INCOME AND
10 HIGHEST-INCOME JEWISH DIVISIONS USED IN STUDY

Income level	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
Lowest 10	1,726	3,007	4,733	36
Highest 10	1,735	3,955	5,690	30

TABLE 18

1975 GENERAL ELECTION: RIZZO VOTE IN JEWISH DIVISIONS

Ward	Division	Rizzo	Total
8	11	103	322
8	16	149	593
8	17	106	369
8	18	139	466
8	22	93	399
8	23	92	388
8	29	200	593
15	4	178	387
15	6	155	537
34	26	271	450
34	29	357	585
34	30	303	491
34	31	193	335
34	32	240	380
34	37	152	371
34	39	197	336
34	41	228	374
52	2	181	395
52	3	172	365
52	4	186	308
52	5	337	545
52	6	139	251
52	7	330	541
52	8	140	294
52	10	249	424
53	4	252	420
53	5	333	560
53	6	320	515
53	7	307	520
53	9	210	394
53	11	240	364
53	13	405	615
53	14	216	416
53	19	352	651
53	23	304	535
54	3	290	437
54	4	283	409
54	6	383	562
54	11	225	394
54	12	436	689
54	18	174	303
54	24	194	351
56	1	292	496
56	5	160	336
56	21	273	421
56	24	265	547
56	25	331	555
56	26	312	532

(continued)

(TABLE 18 continued)

Ward	Division	Rizzo	Total
56	27	211	379
56	28	227	423
56	29	305	505
56	34	334	636
56	38	210	402
63	7	188	458
63	15	189	387
63	18	156	327
63	21	136	336
63	22	235	484
63	23	172	383
63	24	139	326
Total		13,955	26,576

Support for Rizzo: 53 percent

TABLE 19

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1: VOTE IN PREDOMINANTLY PUERTO RICAN DIVISIONS

Ward	Division	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
8	26	41	73	114	36
8	27	4	87	91	4
15	3	39	192	231	17
19	5	40	119	159	25
19	6	38	106	144	26
19	8	36	89	125	29
Total		198	666	864	23

TABLE 20

1975 GENERAL ELECTION: RIZZO VOTE IN PUERTO RICAN DIVISIONS

Ward	Division	Rizzo	Total
8	26	42	65
8	27	56	83
15	3	210	256
19	5	120	145
19	6	102	130
19	8	108	142
Total		638	821

Support for Rizzo: 78 percent

TABLE 21

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1:
VOTE IN PREDOMINANTLY UPPER-INCOME WASP DIVISIONS
IN SOCIETY HILL AND CHESTNUT HILL

Ward	Division	Yes	No	Total	Percent Yes
5	1	67	403	470	14
5	2	71	414	485	15
5	3	81	417	498	16
5	4	61	441	502	12
5	5	110	446	556	20
5	6	69	421	490	14
5	7	68	467	535	13
5	8	40	491	531	8
5	9	104	446	550	19
5	11	66	415	481	14
5	12	39	133	172	23
5	16	59	175	234	25
5	18	69	460	529	13
5	25	51	295	346	15
5	26	36	288	324	11
9	2	48	459	507	9
9	3	95	483	578	16
9	7	65	383	448	15
9	8	62	285	347	18
9	9	101	626	727	14
9	10	97	384	481	20
9	11	111	583	694	16
9	12	62	389	451	14
9	16	145	558	703	21
9	17	77	344	421	18
Total		1,854	10,206	12,060	15

TABLE 22

1975 GENERAL ELECTION: RIZZO VOTE IN
UPPER-INCOME WASP DIVISIONS IN SOCIETY HILL AND CHESTNUT HILL

Ward	Division	Rizzo	Total
5	1	71	316
5	2	145	432
5	3	83	378
5	4	97	302
5	5	75	290
5	6	69	265
5	7	89	331
5	8	35	276
5	9	98	259
5	11	77	327
5	12	42	85
5	16	60	118
5	18	91	400
5	25	100	265
5	26	33	203
9	2	70	402
9	3	178	462
9	7	122	333
9	8	87	303
9	9	139	558
9	10	124	384
9	11	111	466
9	12	72	339
9	16	220	600
9	17	91	255
Total		2,379	8,349

Support for Rizzo: 28 percent

TABLE 23

1978 CHARTER QUESTION 1: ETHNIC GROUP TURNOUT RATES

Group	Votes on Question 1	Eligible Voters	Percent Voting
Blacks	89,269	140,769	63
Whites	323,738	459,304	70
Poles	4,870	6,978	70
Italians	40,663	54,237	75
Irish	12,856	18,349	70
Jews	29,461	40,765	72
Puerto Ricans	864	2,695	32
Society Hill and Chestnut Hill WASPS	12,060	16,456	73
All voters	710,307	1,041,834	68

TABLE 24

GROUP DEFECTION RATES FROM 1975 TO 1978
(Percent)

Group	1975 support	1978 support	Point loss	Defection rates
Blacks	34	4	-30	-88
Poles	80	62	-18	-23
Italians	83	85	+ 2	+ 2
Irish	74	61	-13	-18
Jews	53	31	-22	-42
Puerto Ricans	78	23	-55	-71
Society Hill and Chestnut Hill WASPS	28	15	-13	-46

Figure 1

PERCENT SUPPORT FOR QUESTION 1 IN PREDOMINANTLY BLACK WARDS
AND PREDOMINANTLY WHITE WARDS




Figure 2

PERCENT SUPPORT FOR QUESTION 1 AMONG VARIOUS GROUPS





Figure 3

RANGES IN THE SUPPORT LEVELS OF VARIOUS GROUPS ON QUESTION 1



APPENDIX B

RESEARCH METHODS

Imputing voting behavior to population subgroups through ex-post-facto analysis of aggregate voting returns is a thorny problem. While votes cast reveal the preferences of the voters as a group, we cannot in a secret-ballot election ascribe the voting characteristics of the group to any individual or individuals within it, unless the vote has been unanimous. To do so might be to commit what is known as the ecological fallacy: erroneously imputing the characteristics of an aggregate to one of its component groups.

For example, in a community that is 60 percent Jewish and gives candidate X 60 percent of its vote, we cannot be certain what level of support that candidate received from Jewish voters. If we think of the community as having 60 Jewish and 40 non-Jewish voters and assume that all qualified voters cast votes, all the following combinations and many others would yield 60 percent (60 out of 100 votes) for candidate X:

<u>Jewish Voters for X</u>	<u>Non-Jewish Voters for X</u>	<u>Percent of Jewish Support of X</u>	<u>Percent of Non-Jewish Support of X</u>
60	0	100	0
59	1	98	2.5
58	2	97	5
50	10	83	25
40	20	67	50
36	24	60	60
20	40	33	100

In a city the size of Philadelphia, with over a million registered voters and a voting turnout of over 700,000, one must use extreme caution in attributing a voting outcome to any particular group, unless that group is overwhelmingly represented in the geographic unit in which the outcome was aggregated.

In the present study, we accordingly disaggregated voting results to the smallest units in which they were recorded--the voting precinct or, as it is called in Philadelphia, the electoral division. Only in analyses of the voting patterns of Blacks and of Whites as a whole (as against analyses of particular White ethnic groups) did we use larger aggregates.

Raw registration and election data were used. Registration figures for individual voting divisions were taken from computer printouts, which listed new and prior registrants without totaling them. Election returns by ward and division listed absentee votes separately; we added these in to obtain accurate totals.

Evaluating religious and ethnic groups was markedly difficult, because registration data identify registrants only as "native-born colored" or "White" or as "foreign-born," the latter without identifying the country of birth. Therefore, to locate areas of ethnic or religious concentration, we turned to the U.S. Census data for the Philadelphia SMSA.

Several difficulties surfaced in using this material. First of all, census tract data do not indicate religious preferences of the population, so that areas of Jewish concentration had to be located by using "Russian" as a proxy for Jewish, and eliminating areas of non-Jewish Russians by inspection of voting lists. In a few divisions, substantial numbers of Jews of Polish extraction were registered as well. We also used the advice of political and community leaders and ethnic group specialists to locate groups.

A second problem was that the data, at the tract level, had been gathered more than nine years before the study. Much change, particularly racial transition, had occurred in some Philadelphia wards over the decade, so that an area that appeared to have a considerable homogeneous ethnic concentration in 1970 might have become ethnically mixed by 1978.

A third difficulty was that the Census data list countries of origin only for the foreign-born and the children of foreign-born, and thus underestimate ethnic representation in many neighborhoods or tracts, especially for groups whose forebears came here more than two generations ago.

Finally, census tracts and voting divisions are not coextensive or coterminous. While tracts are considerably smaller than wards (many wards contain four, five or more tracts), most of them comprise several divisions. Furthermore, voting divisions cut across tract boundaries, and census tracts cut across ward boundaries. The major problem is again whether it is safe to impute aggregate characteristics, in this case the ethnicity of a census tract, to a subgroup: an electoral division. For example, in a tract where half the residents are of Italian origin, only half the election divisions may be ethnically Italian.

To overcome these problems, we examined the registration lists (street lists) for each of the election divisions that might be included in the study. Ethnic determinations were based on the percentage of clearly identifiable ethnic names in the division. A division was coded as Polish, Italian or Jewish only if at least half of its registered voters were from the respective group. Generally, the divisions chosen were overwhelmingly homogeneous in point of ethnicity or religion.

In the case of the Irish, special problems abounded. The Irish have been here so long that even in a city where they are thought to be the biggest White ethnic group they are no longer identifiable in large numbers through census tract data. Furthermore, they are very much assimilated here; they tend to cluster less than the other groups

examined and are widely dispersed among heterogeneous tracts and voting divisions. Irish names regularly show up in tracts that are overwhelmingly identifiable as ethnic enclaves of other groups. In any event, Irish names are not easy to identify with certainty; they have become, to some extent, the typical American names, and Irish and English surnames are often identical. (Sometimes first names helped us in coding.) Taking these difficulties into account we coded divisions as Irish according to the same 50-percent-plus requirement that was applied to other ethnic groups.

Income-range estimates for religious, ethnic and racial groups presented several areas of difficulty. In the case of ethnic groups, income data aggregated at the census tract level might not be accurate at the electoral division level. For example, in one heavily Jewish ("Russian") tract, with a median income below the SMSA median, distortion was quite evident. There was one high-rise apartment building, inhabited predominantly by upper-income persons, mostly Jewish; the rest of the tract was composed of a large number of desperately poor Blacks and Puerto Ricans and a small buffer zone of young, aspiring professional families. Rather than estimate income ranges, we eliminated this tract from our study.

An even more troublesome problem was the disparity in income ranges among groups studied. Initially we expected to set up three income categories: low, medium and upper, with low being 20 percent or more below the SMSA median and upper 20 percent or more above it. We were unable to keep this categorization, as most of the six groups we examined did not have voting divisions in which they were a majority in all three income classes.

Therefore, we separated the groups whose voting patterns we analyzed into just two income classes: those from census tracts with median incomes below the 1970 median for the SMSA as a whole (\$8,790), and those from tracts above the median. Blacks and Poles had no upper-income tracts and Jews had no lower-income ones. This does not mean that members of these groups were unrepresented in upper or lower income classes, only that such representation was not sufficiently massed to show up in an area as large as a census tract.

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