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- ²⁵ Anniversary Commemorative Portfolio, *Ibid.*
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A CENTURY OF JEWISH FERTILITY IN RHODE ISLAND

by CALVIN GOLDSCHIEDER, PH.D.

Patterns of reproduction and family size are issues central to Jewish continuity in its most basic form. The level of fertility is linked directly to population growth and indirectly to the Jewish family. Large family size has been linked nostalgically with the distant past, when the size of immigrant families was supposedly large and, by inference, warm and protective. More recently, small family size among American Jews has been associated with the demographic decline of American Jews, who, so it has been argued, are not reproducing themselves in sufficient numbers for population replacement. A systematic examination of what is known about Jewish fertility calls into question some of the more dire predictions about the erosion of Jewish population (Goldscheider, 1986a).

The data from the Rhode Island Jewish community surveys of 1963 and 1987 are particularly well suited to examine issues of Jewish fertility change because we now have an extensive sequence of data that allows us to reconstruct, over about a century, the fertility histories of Jewish women. Since the original study of Jewish fertility in Rhode Island was comprehensive and detailed (see Goldscheider, 1964, 1986b), systematic comparisons can be made that shed light not only on overall changes in fertility but also on patterns of fertility differences among Jews. Thus, we have the opportunity to re-examine a series of relationships for the same community, using similar methodological strategies, and thereby to reconstruct fertility trends and differentials among Jewish women for over a century. The Rhode Island data allow us to examine long-term trends in Jewish fertility, linking them to social and demographic changes in the community. We also explore variation in Jewish fertility within the community for these two survey periods, examining changes in the relationship between religious denominational affiliation and Jewish fertility and investigating the linkages between the changing patterns of labor force participation of women outside of the home and Jewish fertility and the potential for conflict between work and family roles.

COHORT FERTILITY TRENDS

From the 1963 and 1987 surveys of Rhode Island, we constructed the average number of children born to Jewish women who were ever married, for those born in the last decades of the 19th century to the cohort of women born in the period 1963-69. We used the number of children expected as the basis for estimating the family size of those who had not completed their childbearing years — the last three

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cohorts (1953-69) of women in the 1987 survey (Figure 1).*

What do these cohort data show about the variation in fertility over this period of time? Several important features of these data are noteworthy:


(1) The family sizes of the older cohort of women, those born in the last decades of the 19th century, are the highest recorded for the entire range of cohorts—around three children. This characterizes the oldest cohorts in each survey. This is not a large family size by Eastern European Jewish standards or even compared with the women who were having most of their children in the latter part of the 19th century in the United States. These women not only survived to the 1960s and 1980s but were having their children for the most part in the first two decades of the 20th century.

(2) A clear downward shift in completed family size characterizes the cohorts of women born after 1894, reaching a low of between 1.6 children and 1.8 children for the 1904-13 cohorts. These were second generation American women who were having their families in the 1920s and 1930s, reflecting the full impact of the economic depression on fertility levels and the timing of childbearing.

(3) A recovery from these very low, below replacement levels of fertility may be clearly discerned in these data. The recovery is evident for the four cohorts born 1914-33 from the 1963 survey, increasing from 2.0 to 2.5. These were women who were having their families during the late 1930s and through the post-World War II baby boom. A similar increase is evident from the 1987 survey: cohorts of women born 1913-22 had 2.1 children, increasing to around 2.5 children for the 1923-32 birth cohorts. These birth cohorts of women were marrying after World War II (almost all between 1946 and 1958) and having their first child in the period between 1949 and the early 1960s.

(4) The 1987 data allow for an examination of the follow-up of these “baby boom” patterns for the cohorts born after 1933. The two cohorts born 1933 to 1942 had an average completed family size of 2.3 children; family size declined to a low of 1.6 children for the women born in the early post-World War II period (1943-47), who were having their children during the 1960s and early 1970s. They were the

*The concept “cohort” is used in this paper to designate a group of women born in a given period of time and, hence, exposed to similar experiences and pressures in their childbearing patterns. The two surveys overlap in the cohorts covered, allowing us to compare the fertility of several cohorts from each of these surveys. In every case, the approximate cohort overlap reinforces the consistency of the survey results, despite somewhat different methodologies and some variation in the study population covered. In no cohort fertility comparison were there any significant discrepancies between the two surveys. For example, the 1929-33 birth cohort of women reconstructed from the 1987 cohort had an average family size of 2.4. Both the 1914-23 cohorts reconstructed from the 1963 survey and the 1913-22 birth cohort of the 1987 survey had the same average family size of 2.1 children. The largest discrepancy between the two surveys was 0.2 children for the cohorts born during the 1920s.



offspring of the post-World War II baby boom; their parents had 2.4 children on average, but they are not likely to have more than 1.6 children.

(5) There are already indications from the 1987 Rhode Island survey of a new average family size emerging among the cohorts born in the late 1940s that indicate that the 1.6 average family size of the 1943-47 cohort was exceptionally low. Women born 1948-52 already had an average family size of two children by 1987, higher than the low levels of the 1943-47 cohort. Their younger sisters of the two cohorts 1953-62, those already married and those not married, are expecting to have around the same family size of two children.

Comparing these family size patterns and family size expectations from the 1987 survey data with results from the 1963 survey data on the Greater Providence Metropolitan Area shows a general stability in the overall low levels of completed and expected family size that has characterized the Jewish community over the last century: this low level has fluctuated around two children per family for the last several generations. The average family size of all ever-married women in 1963 was 2.1, as it was for the 1987 survey.

Assuming that the actual family size of the youngest cohort of Jewish women is very highly correlated with their expected family size, then average family size will remain at population replacement level for the Jewish community of Rhode Island.

The youngest birth cohort of all women that we can examine with confidence in the new Rhode Island survey expect to have 2.2 children. This level of expected family size is consistent with data from other Jewish community surveys and national data that indicate similar levels of expected family size (see Goldscheider, 1986a; Goldscheider and Mosher, 1988; Goldscheider and Goldscheider, 1989a, 1989b).

In order to link these fertility trends to other indicators of societal change, we combined them in a way that allows us to capture the fundamental social, economic, family, and demographic changes that the Jewish population has experienced in the last century. In Table 1 we present the fertility patterns of each of these broader generations and describe selected aspects of the detailed social and demographic data that characterize them. The socioeconomic data were constructed from the more general information of the two Rhode Island surveys and are general approximations rather than precise indicators.

The first cohort combines all women who were born in the last decades of the 19th century, who were ages 65 and older in the 1963 survey. These women had three children on average. Fully four out of ten had four or more children and only three percent were childless. Most of these women were foreign born, married at around age 20, and had their first child 12-18 months after marriage at age 21 or 22. Few of these women worked after they married, but well over 95 percent married and very few were divorced. Women of this cohort averaged about eight years of secular education and even fewer years of formal Jewish education. About one-fourth had no Jewish education. Many of these women started out their married life with few resources and generally were better off economically than their parents but struggled to improve their standard of living. Those who went to high school, and those who had higher levels of education, married later (usually at age 24), and had fewer children (about 2.3) compared to their sisters who had less education, married much earlier, and had 3.6 children. The women of this cohort clearly wanted better for their children from the new opportunities emerging in American society. Most of these women were Orthodox in affiliation and in practice, and almost none married non-Jews.

This pattern sharply contrasts with the social, demographic, and fertility profile of the cohorts directly exposed to the economic depression in the late 1920s and 1930s in the United States, women who were born in the first decade-and-a-half of the 20th century. Those women had 1.7 children on average, fully 14 percent were childless, an additional 26 percent had only one child, and only three percent had four or more children. Thus, while four out of ten women of the late 19th century cohorts had four or more children, four out of ten of the women of the depression cohorts had no children or only one child.

TABLE 1
Family Size Distributions and Selected Social and Demographic Characteristics
of Five Birth Cohorts: Rhode Island Jewish Population

	Late 19th Century	Depression Cohorts	Baby Boom	1970s Cohorts	1990s Cohorts
Number of Children*					
None	3	14	5	7	14
One	9	26	7	18	10
Two	24	39	43	56	47
Three	25	18	35	13	20
Four+	39	3	10	6	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Average	3.1	1.7	2.5	2.0	2.1
Social and Demographic Indicators**					
Age at Marriage	20	24	21	24	26
Foreign Born	80	25	10	3	2
2nd Gener.	20	65	45	20	10
3rd+ Gener.	X	10	45	77	88
Years of Education	8	12	14	16	18
% Never Married	3	7	5	11	15?
% Divorced	0.5	2.5	12	15	20?
Intermarried	1.2	5.6	6.6	20	25?
Orthodox	52	20	6	4	7
Reform	10	20	33	35	35
% No Jewish Education	25	25	18	15	13

*For the 1990s cohort, estimate is based on family size expectations.

** These indicators refer to women of this cohort.

Source: 1963 Survey of Greater Providence and 1987 Survey of R.I.

The women of this second cohort were largely second generation Americans, married at ages 23 or 24, and had their first child two to three years after they married, when they were around age 26. Some of these women worked during the span of time between when they were in high school and when they married, but only about 20 percent worked after they began to have children. Most were exposed to the hardships of the economic depression that had wiped out many of the early gains of their parents' generation. Almost all grew up in foreign-born families and associated their Jewishness with the "old world" of their immigrant parents' generation. Taking advantage of the access to public education and having parents who had sufficient resources to encourage even their daughters to spend a longer time in school, most of the women completed high school. And the more extensive their education, the later their marriage age and the fewer their children; the very clear inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and fertility (the higher the education, the smaller the family size) was weakening as almost all these women were under economic pressure to have very small families. Only a small proportion intermarried with non-Jews in this generation, but clearly more than in their parents' generation, and those that did were rarely integrated in the Jewish community. While most grew up in Orthodox homes, only about 20 percent remained Orthodox as adults, 20 percent were affiliated with Reform Judaism, and over half identified with Conservative Judaism. Still the level of Jewish education for these women was low, and one-fourth had no formal Jewish education.

The baby boom cohorts born in the mid 1920s through the mid 1930s increased their family size to 2.5 children, but did not return to the pattern characteristic of the pre-depression cohorts where large proportions of women had four or more children. A comparison of the family size distributions of the baby boom and depression cohorts shows clearly that the increase in family size among the former was the result of an increase in the proportion of two children and the near doubling of the percent of women who had three children (from 18 percent to 35 percent), along with the sharp decline in childlessness and the one child family. While the proportion with four or more children increased from 3 percent to 10 percent, there was no return to the significantly higher levels characteristic of the late 19th century cohort. The women who were having children during the baby boom were marrying at ages 21 or 22, earlier than those who were having children during the 1930s; they also were having their first child at an earlier age.

Increasing proportions of this cohort were third generation Americans, but an equal number grew up in households where their parents were foreign born. Higher proportions attended college, and many did not work while raising their families but returned to work, often part time, after their children went off to college or got married. The women who worked were largely in clerical and sales jobs, with teaching and social work their major professional occupations. Significant increases

were taking place in the level of their socioeconomic gains, reinforced by the stability of their life styles. Few of these women divorced, but many more did so than the cohort facing the economic depression; almost all married, and there were no indications of significant increases in the extent of marriage with persons who were not born Jewish. There were increases in both the level of Jewish education and in the proportion who identified with Reform and Conservative Judaism, with less than 10 percent identifying themselves as Orthodox. This period of upward social mobility placed almost all Jews of this cohort in the middle classes, with those left behind in the lower classes having fewer children than their sisters in the middle and upper classes. The traditional inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and fertility had weakened and tended to be positive.

The fourth cohort covers women who were having children in the 1970s (women who were born in the late 1940s and early 1950s). They reduced their family size by 20 percent from 2.5 children of the baby boom cohorts to 2.0 children on average. These birth cohorts of the 1970s were distinctive in the very high proportion with two children (56 percent), their higher level of one child families, and lower levels of the three or more child families. But they had not returned to the pattern of the childless family characteristic of the economic depression cohorts. These women were caught up in the major changes in the women's movement in the United States, questioning the traditional role of women in the household and traditional marriages in general. Fully three-fourths of these third generation Jewish American women had at least some exposure to college, and about half completed college. Many more viewed having children and family continuity as a role conflict with their individual independence and autonomy as women. Greater emphasis was placed by them on their careers, and new patterns were emerging of later marriage, increased divorce, and increased independence. Intermarriage with non-Jews increased significantly with this cohort, along with a continuing decline of affiliation with traditional Judaism, Orthodox and Conservative Judaism. More remained Jewish ethnically, in ways that were less "religious" and ritual oriented and less linked to the formal institutional and organizational structure of the Jewish community.

We obviously do not really know what the fertility levels will be of the generation born in the middle to late 1960s who will be having their families until the end of the 20th century. We also do not know the nature of their social and demographic patterns as these too will unfold in the course of the next two decades. We can estimate some of these future patterns on the basis of current characteristics, values, and attitudes.

One important implication of the current family size expectations of the cohort of the 1990s is that they, too, will have some distinctive patterns of fertility. It is likely that the level of their fertility will not be exceptional compared with the long-

term pattern of two children on average that has characterized this community and the American Jewish population as a whole for several generations. If the expected family size of women born between 1958-69 cohorts materializes in the 1990s, then the 2.1 children these women expect to have will be exactly at replacement levels. More of this cohort will be childless (a return to that feature of the depression cohorts), but significantly fewer will have only one child, and there should be a somewhat larger proportion who will have three or more children compared with the cohort of the 1970s. These women and men will marry significantly later than previously recorded cohorts, are likely to begin their childbearing in their early thirties, and divorce, remarriage, and intermarriage are likely to increase substantially. Almost 90 percent of these women will have gone to college, 75 to 80 percent will be working outside the home full time or part time, most during the period while their children are in school and growing up in their household. Most will have some exposure to Jewishness through formal Jewish education and are likely to continue their connections with the Jewish community. They are not likely to identify Judaism (*i.e.*, the religious element) as a major component of their Jewishness; if their current attitudes and values are indicative, they are likely to view the core of their Jewishness in terms of family connections and the State of Israel. They will have been exposed to an increasing number of years in formal Jewish education, and significant numbers will have visited Israel or at least will consider the State of Israel a major part of their Jewish identity. Less than 10 percent are likely to think of themselves as Orthodox, 40 percent will affiliate with Conservative Judaism, and about one-third will be Reform.

FERTILITY VARIATION AMONG JEWS

Four major sociodemographic changes have occurred in American Jewish communities that are linked to these fertility trends: (1) the transformation of the socioeconomic status of Jews, particularly their high levels of educational attainment and occupational achievement; (2) ecological changes and the residential dispersal of the Jewish community; (3) changes in the expression of Judaism and Jewishness; and (4) the revolution in women's roles. The broad societal level linkages to cohort fertility trends that we have examined can be translated into specific questions about fertility differentials at the group level. We review below four differentials that have been important in the study of Jewish fertility in the United States.

The major internal social class variations characteristic of earlier cohorts which experienced rapid generational economic mobility have all but disappeared among recent cohorts. Most young adult Jews have at least completed college, and in the Rhode Island data about half of the young adult men and women age 25-44 had been to graduate school; 40 percent of the men and 50 percent of the women were in professional occupations. And these are second generation college-educated men

and women, the children of college-educated parents. Therefore, the social class variant in fertility operates within a very narrow range between those with some college education, those who completed college, and those with graduate school education. Indeed, not to have completed college is increasingly a rare event in the American Jewish community. The relationship between fertility and social class is no longer a low-middle-high comparison but a comparison among those whose life styles and values are from the lower middle to the upper middle classes. It is not surprising, therefore, that few family size differences can be documented that are statistically significant by these educational or occupational measures.

The shifting residential pattern — from urban to suburban and back to urban areas, as well as to new areas of residence that have lower levels of Jewish density — continues long term ecological processes characteristic of American Jews. There are areal differences in fertility, particularly between suburban and urban areas, but these are related in complex ways to Jewish fertility, reflecting the age composition and life course differences among areas and the selective migration of families (suburbs have younger families, and older persons are concentrated in urban places).

Two important sources of fertility variation — religiosity and the role of women — have changed over the last quarter of a century. In the 1960s, the results of fertility studies of the Jewish community of Greater Providence as well as in other United States communities pointed to a changing relationship between religiosity and Jewish fertility. Those who defined themselves as Orthodox or demonstrated other measures of religious observance (regular synagogue attendance or the regular performance of religious rituals) had a larger family size than those who defined themselves as Conservative or Reform Jews and who were less observant of religious rituals. These differences by religiosity were narrowing over the generations, as exposure to American society changed the religious life styles of all the Jewish denominations. Most, if not all, of the differences among Jews by religious denomination were a direct result of the social class composition of these religious categories. Thus, for example, few fertility differences among the various levels of religious observances remained after eliminating the effects of social class and generation. There was no indication from the data that religious ideological factors influenced the reproductive behavior of Jewish women in the United States (see Goldscheider, 1964, 1986b).

A quarter of a century later, the 1987 survey data showed (Table 2) that there were small and insignificant differences between the fertility patterns of those who define themselves as Conservative and Reform Jews. However, those who currently define themselves as Orthodox have somewhat larger families than Conservative and Reform Jews, a trend evident among those over age 65 as well as among those age

TABLE 2

Average Family Size by Religious Denominational Affiliation,
Cohorts of Women Born Before 1898 to 1953-1969;
Expected Family Size by Labor Force Participation Of Women
Rhode Island Jewish Population

Age	Birth Cohort	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform
(1963 Survey)				
65+	Before 1898	3.1	2.7	2.5
45-64	1899-1918	1.8	2.0	2.0
35-44	1919-1928	2.4	2.2	2.4
(1987 Survey)				
65+	Before 1922	2.5	1.8	1.8
45-64	1923-1942	2.4	2.4	2.2
35-44	1943-1952	2.4	1.8	1.6
18-34*	1953-1969	2.5	2.0	1.9

*The average number of children expected to all women was used for this cohort. Note that the number of cases for those who identify themselves as Orthodox is small and should be interpreted with caution.

Age	Birth Cohort	(1987 Survey)**	
		Working	Not Working
40-44	1943-1947	1.5	2.2
35-39	1948-1952	1.9	1.9
18-34	1953-1969	1.9	2.0

**Total number of expected children

Source: 1963 Survey of Greater Providence and 1987 Survey of Rhode Island.

30-39. For example, the average family size among women over age 65 who currently identify themselves as either Conservative or Reform was 1.8 children; among older Orthodox women average family size was 2.5 children. Among those age 35-44 the average number of children born among the Orthodox was 2.4 compared with 1.8 and 1.6 among the Conservative and Reform, respectively. The average number of children already born to women of the cohort born between 1948-57 (*i.e.*, who were age 30-39 in 1987) was 1.6 children for both Conservative and Reform Jews, while among the small number of Orthodox women, the average was around three children. The data on family size expectations of the youngest cohort are consistent with these conclusions: Orthodox women age 18-34 in Rhode Island expect to have 2.5 children, on average, higher than the 2.0 children expected by women who identify themselves with Conservative and Reform Judaism.

These data show, therefore, a very stable level of higher fertility among the Orthodox of the last several generations, of around 2.5 children, and some possibility that younger Orthodox women will have a slightly larger family size. This pattern combines with a tendency among the younger Orthodox toward a pattern of earlier marriage and early childbearing. Although small in number, Orthodox Jews in Rhode Island (and probably elsewhere) are contributing disproportionately to the population growth of Jewish communities in the United States.

A final consideration using the data on expected family size focuses on the impact of the changing labor force participation of Jewish women, their high rate of working outside of the home, and the potential conflict between these new work-career roles and childbearing. In the 1960s the proportion of women working who were married and in the childbearing ages was very low. The data from the survey in 1963 show that the labor force participation rate among women in their reproductive period was very low, around 20 percent, and lower than among non-Jewish women. Indeed, the small number of women who were engaged in work outside of the home in the 1960s precluded a detailed analysis of the relationship between fertility and labor force participation.

It was generally the case in the 1960s that family size was inversely related to the labor force participation of women: women who worked were likely to have fewer children. It was not clear whether the smaller family size of Jewish women who worked was an outcome of "work-related reasons" or whether the causal direction was in the opposite direction, *i.e.*, those with fewer children were more likely to work. Since those who were working were distributed among women both with higher and lower levels of education (the former were more career oriented, and the latter worked to make ends meet), it was difficult to disentangle the social class connection to the lower fertility of working women. In short, in the 1960s there was little basis from the data available to indicate that a critical factor in the lower

fertility of Jewish women in general was the alternative roles to family that Jewish women in particular had uncovered through working in the labor force outside of the home. Nor was there evidence of a specific relationship between labor force participation and Jewish fertility that was critical in understanding the patterns of American Jewish fertility.

In contrast, the data from the 1987 survey suggest that there has been a major change in the extent and the patterns of relationship between fertility and labor force participation of women. First, there has been a major and dramatic increase in the participation of women in the labor force outside of the home. The survey documented that three-fourths of the women age 25-44 and 60 percent of the Jewish women age 45-64 were working for pay outside of the home.

The data point to a clear pattern of larger family size among women age 40-44 who are currently not working compared to the pattern for those working full or part time. Indeed, while women age 40-44 (the birth cohort 1943-47) had around 1.6 children, a particularly low level compared to earlier and later cohorts, women who are not working at all have an average of 2.2 children compared to 1.5 children for those women who are working full or part time.

However, this pattern among the older age cohort does not characterize women in the two younger age cohorts, ages 35-39 and ages 18-34. For those age 35-39, the average expected number of children is similar for women working full time, part time, or not working (1.9 children). For the youngest cohort (age 18-34), working women expected 2.1 children and non-working women expected 2.0 children. These data are based on expectations about completed family size and not actual behavior, and are limited by the small number of cases of non-working women available for analysis (since most of the women are now currently working). Nevertheless, it seems likely that the pattern of conflict between career and childbearing, between women's roles outside the home and having children, is no longer characteristic of younger Jewish women, even though it may have been characteristic of Jewish women in earlier cohorts. It appears from these data that the major increases in the work participation of Jewish women documented by the 1987 survey have not resulted in changes in expected family size, although it is likely to have affected the timing of both marriage and childbearing.

The major changes over the last several decades appear to have been in the timing of childbearing, which has been delayed along with the delay in age at marriage. Changes in the timing of when women have children are more characteristic of educated women and those with careers working outside of the home. These new family formation and childbearing patterns fit the high educational level of Jewish women in Rhode Island and their high level of labor force participation. However,

the new roles that have become characteristic of Rhode Island Jewish women do not appear to have led to significant changes in the number of children expected.

The Jewish population in the United States has experienced major changes in the last century from an immigrant to a fourth generation community (Goldscheider and Zuckerman, 1984; Goldscheider, 1986a; 1986c). Jews have become highly educated, affluent, and have developed new forms of expressing Judaism and Jewishness. In the context of these broad transformations, family patterns, including the number of children and the timing of childbearing, have been transformed as well. Fertility changes over the last century have in part reflected the broader changes characterizing the Jewish community, and in part have influenced those changes. These patterns of fertility fit into a broad social science framework that links demographic change to social, economic, and family transformations that have characterized the American Jewish community in the processes of integration and modernization.

The evidence we have presented shows that a century of cohort fertility trends and differentials reflects the contexts of American society and the distinctive socioeconomic and family patterns of Jews. Of critical importance for the analysis of fertility, as well as for family and fertility policies, is the emphasis on the changing roles of Jewish women and the impact of this revolution on recent demographic patterns. The data from several studies have revealed the adjustments American Jewish women and men have made to the challenges of both family and work roles. It is clear from these studies and the data that we have presented that there has been a rejection of the "traditional" family but not a rejection of new forms of family relationships that are more egalitarian. There is no evidence that the changes in family roles of women and men have resulted in a pattern of fertility decline that portends the demographic erosion of the Jewish community. It is clear that a critical theme in Jewish fertility studies is how the changing roles of women in the 1970s and 1980s have affected their family formation patterns and their family size. It is likely that Jewish fertility patterns (particularly the timing of childbearing and the relationships between specific socioeconomic factors and fertility, not necessarily the level of fertility *per se*) will remain distinctive, both relative to the non-Jewish American population as a whole and relative to earlier cohorts of Jewish families in the United States.



BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

The data presented in this paper were collected as part of a larger project sponsored by the Jewish Federation of Rhode Island and Brown University. The basic data and its methodology are detailed and described in Goldscheider and Goldstein, 1988. Sidney Goldstein shared joint responsibility for collecting and organizing the data. I accept the responsibility for the specific data analyses and interpretations in this paper. Professor Frances K. Goldscheider provided helpful comments on an earlier draft. An earlier and more detailed version of this paper was presented at the Tenth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, Israel, August, 1989. Judith Cohen was helpful in recasting and suggesting revisions for this version.

A copy of the data from the 1987 survey has been filed in the North American Jewish Data Bank. A general report on the 1987 Rhode Island survey containing extensive descriptive materials on the community and its changes over the last quarter of a century is available in Goldscheider and Goldstein, 1988. This volume also includes some general substantive comparisons between the findings of the 1987 and 1963 surveys and notes some differences in the survey populations covered and the different methodologies utilized. The 1963 survey of the Greater Providence Metropolitan Area was analyzed extensively in Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968, and reprinted in 1985. It also was used as the basis of a detailed descriptive report to the Jewish community in Goldstein, 1964. In addition, the fertility data of the 1963 survey were analyzed in detail and were reported on in a 1964 doctoral dissertation and in a series of articles in the 1960s. A reprint of the dissertation and a list of articles on Jewish fertility that used the 1963 data are reviewed and documented in Goldscheider, 1986b. This volume contains materials on Jewish fertility from the 1963 survey that were not previously accessible in published form, and includes a brief new introduction as well. An overview of the changes in the Jewish community over the last 25 years was presented in this journal in Goldstein, *et al*, 1988.

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